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The Biter Bit* 
UNKNOWABLE DANGERS, THE THIRD 
RESTATEMENT, AND THE REINSTATEMENT OF 
LIABILITY WITHOUT FAULT† 
Ellen Wertheimer‡ 
INTRODUCTION  
Strict products liability developed out of a perceived 
need to protect consumers from the costs engendered by 
defective products. The basic idea was that manufacturers 
should be liable for the injuries caused by their defective 
products even—maybe especially—in the absence of 
manufacturer negligence. Indeed, if it were sufficient for 
liability to result only for negligent design, failure to warn, or 
mismanufacture, there would have been no need for a new 
theory of liability, because negligence-based liability would 
have provided adequate consumer protection. It was widely 
recognized, however, that negligence-based liability was not 
enough, and that manufacturers should be responsible for 
injuries caused by the products they designed, labeled, 
marketed, and sold, even if their conduct had been reasonable. 
  
 * “The Biter Bit” is an ironic short story by Wilkie Collins. In this story, a 
young police officer (the Biter of the title) is himself bitten by his wish to show up the 
old guard police force. The analogy here, of course, is that those who would have 
eradicated strict products liability in the Third Restatement may well have caused its 
rejuvenation, as this article discusses. See Wilkie Collins, The Biter Bit in WILKIE 
COLLINS, TALES OF TERROR AND THE SUPERNATURAL 268-94 (1972).  
 † © 2005 Ellen Wertheimer. All Rights Reserved. 
 ‡ Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. I want to thank 
Christine Andreoli and Joseph Larkin, my research assistants, and Nazareth 
Pantoloni, librarian extraordinaire, for their help in writing this article. I am also 
grateful to Mark Rahdert for his suggestions. 
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The costs of such injuries had to fall somewhere, and, as 
between an innocent plaintiff and an innocent manufacturer, 
the courts chose the manufacturer. In order to accomplish this, 
the courts needed a new theory of liability, one that went 
beyond negligence. When the new theory was codified in the 
form of § 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts,1 the courts 
enthusiastically and almost uniformly adopted it as the law of 
their jurisdictions.2 Under strict products liability theory, and 
under § 402A, manufacturers would be liable for their defective 
products even if the manufacturers had exercised all due care 
in the design and manufacturing process. 
  
 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides: 
(1) One who sells any property in a defective condition unreasonably 
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to 
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or 
consumer . . . 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although 
(a)  the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and 
sale of his product . . . . 
Id. 
 2 As the court pointed out in Berman v. Watergate West, Inc., 391 A.2d 1351, 
1356 (D.C. Cir. 1978): 
Subsequent to the decision in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. and the 
promulgation of § 402A of the Restatement, the concept of strict liability in 
tort spread rapidly. At the date of this writing, the CCH Products Liability 
Reporter lists 45 states as having adopted the concept. One other state and 
the District of Columbia are cautiously placed on this list with a footnote 
reading “inferred by court decision.”  
Id. (footnotes omitted); Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 513 P.2d 268, 
272 (Mont. 1973) (“The trend seems to be to adopt the theory of strict liability as it has 
now been adopted by a majority of the states. . . . We adopt the definition, as other 
jurisdictions have, set forth in 2 Restatement of Torts 2d § 402A . . . .”); Turner v. 
Hudson, 1986 Me. Super. LEXIS 278, at *5 (Me. Dec. 12, 1986) (“In almost every other 
jurisdiction, strict liability is common law doctrine. The highest courts of other states 
have simply ‘adopted’ § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.”); Phipps v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 963 (Md. 1976) (“Almost all of the courts of our sister 
states have adopted the strict liability principles set forth in § 402A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts. Several reasons for adopting strict liability are summarized . . . We 
find the above reasons persuasive. . . . Therefore, we adopt the theory of strict liability 
as expressed in § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.”). As the court stated in  
Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 432-33 (N.D. Ind. 1965): 
The direction of the law is clear. Again drawing on the language of and 
authorities cited by Judge Wisdom in Putman, we find that “Part of the 
impetus has come from an almost unanimous call from the authorities in the 
field of torts.” If the Restatement correctly states the conditions of recovery 
now in practice, let those elements have a fresh name. . . . The question is 
now squarely before this court and must be decided. It is perhaps fortuitous 
that the Indiana Supreme Court has not yet passed on this issue, but 
doubtlessly that forward-looking court would embrace the Restatement 
(Second), Torts §402A, and the many recent cases and authors who have done 
likewise, as eminently just and as the law of Indiana today. 
Id. (internal citations omitted).  
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There were three types of defect. Products could be 
defective in design, in warning, or in manufacture. All three 
types of defect were covered under § 402A by a single rule of 
strict liability. Of the three, the last, mismanufactured 
products, need not detain us here: manufacturers have for 
many decades been liable for mismanufactured products under 
a theory of res ipsa loquitur.3 This basis for liability seamlessly 
became the mismanufacture doctrine of 402A, and has caused 
neither courts nor manufacturers any qualms. 
Strict liability for design defects and failure to warn, 
however, began causing courts problems as soon as § 402A was 
adopted. Most jurisdictions had never imposed liability without 
fault in such a broad spectrum of cases, although liability 
without fault was not unknown, even in tort cases, where res 
ipsa loquitur had come to function as a form of liability without 
fault. In Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., for example, the 
defendant manufacturer presented “pretty near infallible” 
evidence that it had acted as a reasonable manufacturer in the 
bottle-filling and inspection processes,4 but no one was 
interested because the bottle exploded.5 It is more than possible 
that Coca-Cola was not, in fact, negligent.6 In fact, the plaintiff 
  
 3 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (exploding soda 
bottle). 
 4 Id. at 440. 
 5 Id. at 439-40:  
[T]he evidence appears sufficient to support a reasonable inference that the 
bottle here involved was not damaged by any extraneous force after delivery 
to the restaurant by defendant. It follows, therefore, that the bottle was in 
some matter defective at the time defendant relinquished control, because 
sound and properly prepared bottles of carbonated liquids do not ordinarily 
explode when carefully handled. . . . Under the general rules pertaining to 
the doctrine, . . . it must appear that bottles of carbonated liquid are not 
ordinarily defective without negligence by the bottling company. . . . Although 
it is not clear in this case whether the explosion was caused by an excessive 
charge or a defect in the glass, there is a sufficient showing that neither 
cause would ordinarily have been present if due care had been used. 
Id. See also Rizzo v. Corning, Inc., 105 F.3d 338, 343 (7th Cir. 1997) (“A carafe designed 
to be used for years, not months, breaks in half without being dropped or banged or 
cleaned with abrasive cleaners or damaged in a flood or fire. In these unusual 
circumstances the accident itself is sufficient evidence of a defect to permit, though of 
course not compel, the jury to infer a defect.”); Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp., 785 F.2d 
720, 733 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Under Hawaii law, application of res ipsa loquitur raises no 
presumption of negligence. The doctrine merely establishes a prima facie case of 
negligence; it allows the case to go to the jury.”); Higgins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 699 
S.W.2d 741, 743 (Ark. 1985) (“Strictly speaking, since proof of negligence is not in 
issue, res ipsa loquitur has no application to strict liability; but the inferences which 
are the core of the doctrine remain, and are no less applicable.”). 
 6 As the court pointed out:  
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admitted that she could not prove negligence on the part of the 
defendant.7  The court was not concerned. 
Unlike mismanufacture cases, however, failure to warn 
and design defect cases presented problems for courts 
accustomed to negligence-based liability. In design and failure 
to warn cases, courts found it difficult to develop standards 
that would differentiate strict liability from negligence, 
simplify the plaintiffs’ burden of proof, yet stop short of 
imposing absolute liability on manufacturers for all product-
related injuries. Negligence had proven inadequate in 
providing the level of consumer protection that courts felt was 
necessary in the modern era, and plaintiffs’ resources were 
viewed as similarly inadequate to compete with the resources 
available to manufacturers. But no one felt that all injuries 
should be compensated, just those caused by defective 
products.8 
Two types of defect—in design and in warning—are the 
focus of this analysis. The thesis of this article is that courts, 
initially enthusiastic about strict products liability, gradually 
retreated from their own standards for imposing liability until, 
in many jurisdictions, strict products liability ceased to exist. 
The Third Restatement of Products Liability, ostensibly 
codifying this incremental retreat into black-letter law, 
eliminated any strictness from products liability and 
transformed it back into a negligence-based doctrine. Some 
courts, however, forced to confront the Third Restatement=s 
clear recognition of the doctrine’s collapse, subsequently 
remembered why they had adopted strict products liability in 
the first place and returned to the doctrine. The very 
codification of what had been an incremental process forced 
  
It is true that defendant presented evidence tending to show that it exercised 
considerable precaution by carefully regulating and checking the pressure in 
the bottles and by making visual inspections for defects in the glass at 
several stages during the bottling process. It is well settled, however, that 
when a defendant produces evidence to rebut the inference of negligence 
which arises upon application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it is 
ordinarily a question of fact for the jury to determine whether the inference 
has been dispelled. 
Escola, 150 P.2d at 440. 
 7 Id. at 438 (“Plaintiff then rested her case, having announced to the court 
that being unable to show any specific acts of negligence she relied completely on the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.”). 
 8 See Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Or. 1974) (en 
banc) (“No one wants absolute liability where all the article has to do is cause injury.”). 
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courts fully to confront the implications of such process, and 
they did not like what they saw. 
Part I of this article outlines the definitions of defect, in 
which the seeds of the retreat from strict products liability 
were planted. While the definitions of defect have been 
discussed on numerous occasions, both in cases9 and in legal 
literature,10 the discussion in this article will focus on the three 
problem points of unknowable dangers, consumer expectation 
and reasonable alternative designs. Part II discusses the 
incremental erosion of strict products liability for unknowable 
dangers, and the turn away from the consumer expectation 
test. Part III discusses the legal climate prior to the writing of 
the Third Restatement, including the advent of negligence-
based defenses to strict products liability and the concomitant 
breakdown in the doctrine’s conceptual framework. Part IV 
analyzes the codification of a negligence standard for strict 
liability as set forth by the Third Restatement. The article then 
documents the subsequent judicial trend toward returning to 
the pro-consumer policies of origin, arguing that the Third 
Restatement, by its very rejection of strict products liability, 
forced courts to confront the logical end result of their own 
incremental rejection of the doctrine. Several courts, when so 
confronted, have elected to reinstate strict products liability 
rather than preside over its demise.  
I. THE EARLY DAYS OF DEFINING DEFECT: EASY CASES 
MAKE PROBLEMATIC LAW 
Once courts decided that strict products liability was a 
good idea, they set about defining its scope. Everyone agreed 
that manufacturers should not be liable for all injuries caused 
  
 9 See Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 553 (Cal. 
1991); Brown v. Super. Ct., 751 P.2d 470, 474-75, 477 (Cal. 1988); Barker v. Lull Eng’g 
Co., 573 P.2d 443, 446 (Cal. 1978); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 384-85 
(N.J. 1984); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 544 (N.J. 1982); 
Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Or. 1974).  
 10 See Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From 
Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 602 
(1980) (discussing the problems engendered by imprecise judicial analysis of the notion 
of design defect); James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping with the Time Dimension in 
Products Liability, 69 CAL. L. REV. 919, 920 (1981) (concluding that judicial reliance on 
hindsight by applying knowledge and attitudes prevailing at the time of trial in 
assessing defect is unwarranted); Frank J. Vandall, “Design Defect” in Products 
Liability: Rethinking Negligence and Strict Liability, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 61 (1982) 
(examining the origins of the Restatement’s definition of defect and proposing a 
functional defect test).  
 2/22/2005 7:18:58 PM 
894 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:3 
by their dangerous products; they should only be liable for 
injuries caused by their defective products.11 Thus, dangerous 
products fell into two categories: dangerous and defective 
products, and dangerous and non-defective ones. Into the latter 
group would fall reasonably dangerous products like knives, 
ladders, and automobiles, and certain prescription 
pharmaceuticals like vaccines. Into the former would fall 
unreasonably dangerous products, products that fit the 
definition of defective. 
The first step in developing strict products liability 
doctrine was thus to define defect. Not all dangerous products 
would be considered defective; strict liability was never 
intended to be absolute.12 Unlike defectiveness, dangerousness 
is a factual attribute. Defectiveness, on the other hand, is a 
legal one. Indeed, the difference between dangerous products 
and defective products resembles the difference between 
factual causation and proximate causation. Factual causation 
is, as its name suggests, a finding that the defendant actually 
caused the plaintiff’s injury. Proximate causation, on the other 
hand, represents a legal conclusion that the defendant should 
be liable for the injury. Causation may be factual without being 
proximate: the defendant may have caused the plaintiff’s injury 
  
 11 Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 981 F.2d 
136, 144 (4th Cir. 1992). While discussing definitions of defect with regard to the 
doctrine of strict liability in tort, the court states: 
What is common to all these definitions is the idea that “defect” in the strict 
liability context is not synonymous with ineffectiveness or “ordinary” 
malfunction; the “defect” must be one that is unreasonably unsafe for the 
intended use of the product. It is the safety and dangerousness of the defect 
that is the essential element of the doctrine. 
Id.; McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 171 (2d Cir. 1997) (“In order for strict 
products liability to apply, there must be a defect, i.e., something wrong with the 
product . . . .”); Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 677 (W. Va. 
1979) (quoting Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443 (Wis. 1967), in which the court held 
that strict liability does not mean that the manufacturer has become the insurer of its 
product nor does it result in absolute liability); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 
A.2d 843 (N.H. 1978); Baughn v. Honda Motor Co., 727 P.2d 655, 660 (Wash. 1986) 
(“Most jurisdictions that employ the risk-utility approach require that there be 
something wrong with the product before a risk-utility analysis is permitted.”). 
 12 The court in Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 963 (Md. 1976) 
pointed out that: 
Thus, the theory of strict liability is not a radical departure from traditional 
tort concepts. Despite the use of the term “strict liability” the seller is not an 
insurer, as absolute liability is not imposed on the seller for any injury 
resulting from the use of his product. Proof of a defect in the product at the 
time it leaves the control of the seller implies fault on the part of the seller 
sufficient to justify imposing liability for injuries caused by the product. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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but not be legally responsible for it.13 Similarly, while all injury-
causing products are dangerous in the factual sense, 
defectiveness is a legal conclusion that the manufacturer is 
responsible for the injury.  
In order to limit the scope of dangerous products for 
which manufacturers would be liable,14 courts needed to define 
defect, and reached various conclusions as to what should 
constitute a defective product. The definitions uniformly 
focused on the product and not on the manufacturer’s conduct. 
As one court observed: 
A negligence action focuses on conduct, specifically the quality of the 
act causing the injury; a strict products liability action focuses on the 
product itself. . . . The rise of strict liability in products liability 
actions results from the perception that the manufacturing 
enterprise can best carry the cost of injuries occasioned by defective 
products as an element of product cost.15 
But courts still needed to specify what characteristics of 
a dangerous product made it defective. The major tests for 
defect that emerged included the imputation of knowledge 
test,16 the risk-utility test,17 and the consumer expectation test.18 
Sometimes the courts used one of these tests exclusively; 
sometimes they used them in combination.19  
Under the imputation of knowledge test, a 
manufacturer would be liable for the injuries caused by a 
product if a reasonable manufacturer, irrebutably presumed to 
  
 13 In the famous case of Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & 
Engineering Co., [1961] App. Cas. 388 (P.C. 1961) (The Wagon Mound No. 1), it was 
indisputable that the defendant had caused the fire by spilling oil on the surface of the 
water. Without the oil, there would have been no material for the plaintiff’s workers to 
ignite. The defendant was not liable to the plaintiff in this case, however, because the 
oil was not the proximate cause of the damage.  
 14 The court in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 573 P.2d 443, 446-47 (Cal. 
1978), reflected on the necessity for defining defect. 
 15 Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 716 F.2d 1425, 1434 (5th Cir. 1983) (footnote 
omitted). 
 16 Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Or. 1974). 
 17 Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248, 254-55 (Miss. 1993), 
superceded by Wolf v. Stanley Works, 757 So. 2d 316, 321 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (noting 
that the risk-utility test “has probably been replaced by the statutory command that 
there is no liability unless the product ‘failed to perform as expected’”) (citing MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(f)(ii) (2004)).  
 18 Barker, 573 P.2d at 446.  
 19 The Supreme Court of Oregon tied together consumer expectation and 
manufacturer reasonableness in Phillips, 525 P.2d at 1036-37 (“A product is defective 
and unreasonably dangerous when a reasonable seller would not sell the product if he 
knew of the risks involved or if the risks are greater than a reasonable buyer would 
expect.”) (quoting Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1973)). 
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know of the product=s danger, would have modified the product 
in some way (design or warning) before selling it.20  Those 
courts that expressed allegiance to this test would not ask what 
a reasonable manufacturer should have known about the 
product—lack of knowledge of the danger was no defense. 
Under this definition of defect, various factors such as the 
utility of the product, the feasibility of altering its design to 
eliminate or reduce the danger without sacrificing its utility, 
and the level of danger would come into play in the course of 
examining the manufacturer=s hypothetical decision-making 
process. The feasibility of an alternative design is highly 
relevant in determining whether the manufacturer should have 
changed the design or whether the product was non-defective 
as designed and sold.21 If a design change had been feasible, it 
would make it more likely that the court would find the 
product defective, because a reasonable manufacturer would 
have changed the design before the product passed out of its 
control. As becomes apparent, this test is quite close to a pure 
risk-utility test, because a reasonable manufacturer necessarily 
engages in a risk-utility balancing process in the design phase 
of every product it makes, and this balancing process informs 
any potential design modification, as well as the decision 
whether to sell the product at all.22  
  
 20 Id. at 1036 (“A dangerously defective article would be one which a 
reasonable person would not put into the stream of commerce if he had knowledge of its 
harmful character. The test, therefore, is whether the seller would be negligent if he 
sold the article knowing of the risk involved. Strict liability imposes what amounts to 
constructive knowledge of the condition of the product.”) (internal footnotes omitted). 
 21 For a discussion of alternative feasible designs, see Ellen Wertheimer, The 
Smoke Gets in Their Eyes: Product Category Liability and Alternative Feasible Designs 
in the Third Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1429, 1432-40 (1994). 
 22 The seven Wade-Keeton factors for evaluating the risks and utility of a 
product are:  
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product–its utility to the user and 
to the public as a whole. (2) The safety aspects of the product–the likelihood 
that it will cause injury and the probable seriousness of the injury. (3) The 
availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not 
be as unsafe. (4) The manufacturer’s ability to eliminate the unsafe character 
of the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to 
maintain its utility. (5) The user’s ability to avoid danger by the exercise of 
care in the use of the product. (6) The user’s anticipated awareness of the 
dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability, because of general 
public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of 
suitable warnings or instructions. (7) The feasibility, on the part of the 
manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the price of the product or 
carrying liability insurance.  
Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 681 n.20 (W. Va. 1979) (citing 
Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng’g Co., 386 A.2d 816, 826-27 (1978)).  
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Under the risk-utility test, a product is defective if its 
risks outweigh its utility. In traditional and literal application, 
knowledge of the danger is irrelevant: the product is examined 
as it was and as it actually performed, including its dangers, 
whether they were known to the manufacturer or not.23 This 
test is close to the imputed knowledge test because a 
reasonable manufacturer performs a risk-utility analysis on its 
products before selling them, and because under neither test is 
the court interested in whether the manufacturer knew of the 
danger, this being tantamount to an imputation of knowledge. 
As with the imputed knowledge test, the feasibility of an 
alternative design is highly relevant in balancing the risks and 
utility of the product in the form in which it was sold, as it may 
(or may not) offer an example of a less harmful solution. 
Under the consumer expectation test, the court asks 
whether the product was more dangerous than a reasonable 
consumer would expect. This test, like the other two, effectively 
imputes knowledge of the danger to the manufacturer, because 
the question is not what the manufacturer knew or should have 
known about the product, but rather whether the product’s 
actual danger was above reasonable consumer expectation. The 
test requires an understanding of consumer expectations, but 
no “understanding about the product itself.”24 Alternative 
designs are perhaps less relevant here, as the focus is on what 
the consumer expected of the particular product at issue. 
The three tests were applied to define all defects, 
whether of design or warning, depending on the test selected by 
the particular jurisdiction.25 The types of defect were not 
treated differently from each other: either a product was 
defective, or it was not.  
In practice as well as theory, the imputed knowledge 
and consumer expectation tests tended to merge into the risk-
utility test. A reasonable manufacturer (under the imputed 
knowledge test) performs a risk-utility test on all its products 
before selling them. A reasonable consumer expects a product 
  
 23 See, e.g., Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 740 P.2d 548, 549 (Haw. 
1987). Without the imputation of knowledge, there would have been no way to prove 
the defendant negligent. 
 24 Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W. 2d 727, 742 (Wis. 2001). 
 25 It is worth noting that a mismanufactured product is defective under all of 
these tests: if a reasonable manufacturer had known of the flaw, that manufacturer 
would have fixed it before selling the product; a flawed product fails any risk-utility 
test; and a reasonable consumer does not, as a matter of law, expect a flawed product. 
Res ipsa loquitur is basically a shortcut to these conclusions.  
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to be one that a reasonable manufacturer would sell.26 Many 
courts simply held that the consumer expectation test included 
the risk-utility test, or abandoned the consumer expectation 
test altogether.27 Whether courts applied a risk-utility test, one 
of the other tests, or a combination, the results proved to be 
controversial in design and warning cases, particularly in 
situations where the product involved an unknowable danger 
or could not be made safer by a change in design. 
II. THE EPIC BATTLES WITH STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY: 
BEFORE THE THIRD RESTATEMENT 
A.  The Demise of Liability for Unknowable Dangers in 
Failure to Warn Cases  
The original tests for defect did not deal explicitly with 
the problem presented by liability for dangers that were 
unknowable at the time the product was manufactured.28  By 
the time the issue arose, the courts had set up their tests for 
defective products. The cases in which the tests for defect were 
adopted did not involve unknowable dangers. For example, 
Phillips v. Kimwood, the leading case expounding the imputed 
knowledge test, concerned an industrial sanding machine that 
presented the risk of regurgitating sheets of plywood back at 
the person using the machine.29 The installation of a set of rear-
facing teeth, an easy and straightforward design change, would 
have eliminated this danger. While the court used the case as a 
vehicle for adopting the imputed knowledge test for defect, the 
  
 26 In Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1037 (Or. 1974) the court 
pointed out that this is  
because a seller acting reasonably would be selling the same product which a 
reasonable consumer believes he is purchasing. That is to say, a 
manufacturer who would be negligent in marketing a given product, 
considering its risks, would necessarily be marketing a product which fell 
below the reasonable expectations of consumers who purchase it.  
 Id.  
 27 See discussion infra Part II.B.  
 28 For the purposes of this article, there is no difference among the time of 
design, manufacture, or sale. See Henderson, Jr., supra note 10, at 963-68. What is 
important is that the manufacturer did not know of the danger before it materialized.  
 29 The details of the accident were as follows: 
The pressure exerted by the pinch rolls in the top half of the machine was 
insufficient to counteract the pressure which the sanding belts were exerting 
upon the thin sheet of fiberboard and, as a result, the machine regurgitated 
the piece of fiberboard back at plaintiff, hitting him in the abdomen and 
causing him the injuries for which he now seeks compensation. 
Phillips, 525 P.2d at 1035. 
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plaintiff could, in all likelihood, have alternatively established 
negligence in design.30 The danger was clearly knowable, and 
the manufacturer arguably was unreasonable for failing to 
protect against it. Similarly, Barker v. Lull Engineering, a 
leading case adopting a combination of consumer expectation 
and risk-utility tests, involved a piece of construction 
equipment that lacked a roll-over shield that would protect the 
operator of the equipment in the event of an accident.31 As with 
Phillips, such a design change was both readily available and 
straightforward, and the manufacturer was arguably negligent 
in designing the product.  The plaintiff could have won a 
negligent design case and did not need strict products liability 
in order to prevail. 
Thus, courts were unprepared for the problem that 
would be presented by lawsuits claiming that a product was 
defective because the manufacturer had failed to warn of a 
danger that was unknowable to the manufacturer. As Phillips 
and Barker demonstrate, the early § 402A cases involved 
eminently knowable dangers, dangers that could be eliminated 
or reduced. The tests for defect adopted in these decisions did 
not differentiate between types of defect or knowable or 
unknowable dangers. This cannot have been accidental: 
potential knowledge of the danger was completely irrelevant to 
the policy that mandated recovery for innocent plaintiffs, even 
when recovery was sought from innocent defendants. Indeed, 
strict products liability was designed specifically to deal with 
cases where the manufacturer had not been negligent. When 
actually confronted with unknowable dangers, however, the 
courts showed a tendency to back down from the principles and 
law of strict products liability. As Professor Owen has 
observed: “[i]n recent years, while an occasional court still 
clings to the notion that strict liability for defective design and 
warnings should not depend upon the foreseeability of the risk, 
most courts squarely confronting the issue have shielded 
  
 30 Id. at 1038-39: 
It is our opinion that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that a 
reasonably prudent manufacturer, knowing that the machine would be fed 
manually and having the constructive knowledge of its propensity to 
regurgitate thin sheets when it was set for thick ones, which the courts via 
strict liability have imposed upon it, would have warned plaintiff’s employer . 
. . and that, in the absence of such a warning, the machine was dangerously 
defective. 
Id. 
 31 Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 446-47 (Cal. 1978). 
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manufacturers from liability for harm caused by unforeseeable 
product risks.”32   
The issue that caused the massive retreat33 from strict 
products liability centered around whether manufacturers 
should be liable for injuries caused by dangers that had been 
unknowable at the time of manufacture. While in theory there 
are design dangers that may have been unknowable at the time 
of manufacture,34 the cases tended to be about failure to warn, 
and inevitably focused on whether a manufacturer should be 
liable for failing to warn of a danger about which the 
manufacturer could not have known.35 With one notable 
exception, Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp.,36 which 
involved asbestos, most of the initial cases dealt with 
prescription pharmaceuticals.37 In response to what was 
  
 32 David Owen, Products Liability Law Restated, 49 S.C. L. REV. 273, 288 
(1998). 
 33 Frank J. Vandall, Constricting Products Liability: Reforms in Theory and 
Procedure, 48 VILL. L. REV. 843, 851-64 (2003) (thoroughly documenting the retreat); 
see also Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the Death of Strict Products 
Liability: The Empire Strikes Back, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1183, 1206-69 (1992) 
[hereinafter Empire]. 
 34 It is difficult to imagine a design defect that would have been unknowable 
in the face of expert testing. In most design cases, the plaintiff could prevail even if 
required to prove negligence, because the failure to uncover the design problem might 
itself prove inadequate product testing. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 
439 (Cal. 1944) makes this clear: 
If the explosion resulted from a defective bottle containing a safe pressure, 
the defendant would be liable if it negligently failed to discover such flaw. If 
the defect were visible, an inference of negligence would arise from the failure 
of defendant to discover it. Where defects are discoverable, it may be assumed 
that they will not ordinarily escape detection if a reasonable inspection is 
made, and if such a defect is overlooked an inference arises that a proper 
inspection was not made. 
Id. 
 35 Clearly, if the danger were knowable, or if the manufacturer failed 
adequately to test the product, the manufacturer would be liable in negligence. 
 36 Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 542 (N.J. 1982). 
 37 Because they involved prescription pharmaceuticals, many of these cases 
extensively discussed comment k of § 402A, which addressed application of products 
liability principles to pharmaceutical products. See, e.g., Stone v. Smith, Kline & 
French Labs., 447 So. 2d 1301, 1303 (Ala. 1984) (stating that comment k “provides for 
drugs and vaccines an exception to the strict liability defined in 402A.”); Brown v. 
Super. Ct., 751 P.2d 470, 475 (Cal. 1988); Wolfgruber v. Upjohn Co., 423 N.Y.S.2d 95, 
97 (App. Div. 1979), aff’d, 417 N.E.2d 1002 (N.Y. 1980) (stating that “[t]he scope of the 
warning is the key factor in a drug products liability suit because prescription drugs 
are ‘unavoidably unsafe products.’”); Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 95 (Utah 
1991) (upheld a blanket exemption for prescription drugs but refused to rely 
exclusively on the plain language of comment k); Young v. Key Pharms., Inc., 922 P.2d 
59, 63 (Wash. 1996) (holding that comment k extends a blanket exemption to 
pharmaceutical drug manufacturers). For further discussion of comment k, see infra 
text accompanying notes 59-70.  
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perceived as the unfairness of holding manufacturers liable for 
failing to warn of dangers about which they could not have 
known, courts almost uniformly, and sometimes with unseemly 
haste,38 backed down from all of the tests for defect that they 
had carefully developed over the preceding years, and imposed 
a knowability requirement. When confronted specifically with 
the prospect of imposing liability on pharmaceutical companies, 
courts justified their retreat by reasoning that the development 
of socially beneficial prescription pharmaceuticals should be 
encouraged and that strict liability would inhibit their 
development.39 This justification, however, did not adequately 
explain the judicial haste in retreating from strict liability, nor 
the breadth of the decisions, which went well beyond 
pharmaceutical cases.40 
The process of this decline—although more like a rout—
is readily documented.41 In Beshada, an asbestos case, the court 
reacted almost with surprise to the defendants’ suggestion that 
they should not be held liable for failing to warn of the 
unknowable dangers of asbestos.42 The court pointed out that 
strict products liability differed from negligence-based liability 
precisely because it imputed knowledge of the danger to the 
manufacturer.43 Allowing the defendant to use lack of 
knowability as a defense would undercut the imputation of 
knowledge test and replace it with the negligence standard 
that § 402A was designed to supplement, thereby rendering § 
402A meaningless.  
The Beshada court noted that it was not asking 
manufacturers to do the impossible in holding them liable for 
  
 38 See Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 386 (N.J. 1984). In Feldman, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court, a scant 23 months after deciding Beshada, ruled that 
imputed knowledge would be restricted to “knowledge at the time the manufacturer 
distributed the product.” Id.  
 39 See Brown, 751 P.2d. at 477 (strict products liability not applicable to 
prescription pharmaceuticals because of special concerns related to that industry).  
 40  See Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 556-57 
(Cal. 1991) (Brown not intended only to apply to prescription pharmaceuticals). 
 41 See Empire, supra note 33. 
 42 Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 547 (N.J. 1982) (“If 
we accepted defendants’ argument, we would create a distinction among fact situations 
that defies common sense.”). 
 43 Id. at 545 (The “difference between negligence and strict liability in 
warning cases . . . [is that] when a plaintiff sues under strict liability, there is no need 
to prove that the manufacturer knew or should have known of any dangerous 
propensities of its product—such knowledge is imputed to the manufacturer.” (quoting 
Freund v. Cellofilm Props., Inc., 432 A.2d 925, 930 (N.J. 1981))). 
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failing to warn of all dangers whether knowable or not.44 It is of 
course impossible to warn of an unknowable danger. 
Impossibility, however, is not the issue: responsibility for the 
product, and for the injuries it has caused, is.45 The basis for 
liability is not negligence, under which doctrine a 
manufacturer would be liable only for dangers about which the 
manufacturer should have known, but rather strict liability, 
under which doctrine the basis for liability is defectiveness. 
Under strict products liability, liability for a product follows 
from responsibility for producing that product, and not from 
negligence in producing it. The manufacturer may not have 
known of the danger, but the plaintiff did not know of it 
either.46 The manufacturer designed, packaged, and sold the 
product, and should accept responsibility for the injuries it 
causes provided the product fails the applicable test for defect. 
The policy of strict products liability allocates the costs of 
defective products to the manufacturer, not the plaintiff. 
“‘[P]ublic policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries 
caused by products . . . be placed on those who market them, 
and be treated as a cost of production’ against which liability 
insurance can be obtained.”47 
Perhaps the fact that Beshada was an asbestos case 
made it easier for the court to rule in favor of the plaintiffs, 
because the public interest arguments that would later emerge 
in prescription pharmaceutical cases were absent. Less than 
two years later, however, in Feldman v. Lederle Labs., the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey backed down from this 
doctrinally pure position and allowed unknowability as a 
defense in a case involving a prescription pharmaceutical.48 One 
might argue that Beshada itself was a product of the “easy 
cases make problematic law” proposition, and it is clear that 
the court was much more comfortable holding asbestos 
manufacturers liable for failing to warn of unknowable dangers 
  
 44 Id. at 546 (“When the defendants argue that it is unreasonable to impose a 
duty on them to warn of the unknowable, they misconstrue both the purpose and effect 
of strict liability. By imposing strict liability, we are not requiring defendant to have 
done something that is impossible.”). 
 45 See Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 716 F.2d 1425, 1434 n.3 (5th Cir. 1983) (“As a 
policy matter, strict liability in products cases deals with enterprise responsibility.”). 
 46 See Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 754-55 (Wis. 
2001) (manufacturer liable for unknowable danger; consumer did not know of the 
danger, and the consumer expectation test applied). 
 47 Id. at 750 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A cmt. c (1965)).  
 48 479 A.2d 374, 386 (N.J. 1984). 
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than it was holding drug manufacturers liable in the same kind 
of case. Be that as it may, the court in Feldman seemed 
horrified at the prospect of holding a manufacturer liable for 
failing to warn of an unknowable danger. Although the court 
denied that it was overruling Beshada,49 it is clear that 
Feldman did exactly that, stating that “[i]f Beshada were 
deemed to hold generally or in all cases . . . that in a warning 
context knowledge of the unknowable is irrelevant in 
determining the applicability of strict liability, we would not 
agree.”50 Feldman allowed manufacturers to argue that they 
should not be liable for failing to warn of an unknowable 
danger.51 As one court pointed out following Feldman: 
Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts 2d does not require that 
the plaintiff prove the manufacturer knew or should have known 
that the product was unreasonably dangerous. However, courts have 
refused to hold defendants strictly liable in the absence of such 
knowledge or reason to know. The New Jersey Supreme Court held 
in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp. (1982), 90 N.J. 191; 
447 A. 2d 539, that a manufacturer could be strictly liable for harm 
caused by a product even when it could not have known of the 
danger at the time of manufacture. This case has not generally been 
followed. Courts instead include foreseeability in their analysis of 
strict liability.52 
Instead of pursuing a case-by-case approach to the risk-
utility test, courts discarded the imputation of knowledge 
approach altogether in the only category of cases where it 
would determine the result: those in which the plaintiff could 
not prove that the danger was knowable.  As one commentator 
put it:  
[D]espite their bold rhetoric, courts are seldom willing to apply the 
imputed knowledge approach in those rare cases where it actually 
makes a difference. Rather, the tendency is to emphasize that 
imputed knowledge differentiates strict liability from negligence only 
  
 49 Id. at 388 (“We do not overrule Beshada, but restrict Beshada to the 
circumstances giving rise to its holding.”). 
 50 Id. at 387. 
 51 All that was left of strict products liability for failure to warn after 
Feldman got through with it was the placement of the burden of showing 
unknowability on the defendant. The plaintiff did not have to prove that the 
manufacturer knew or should have known of the danger; rather, the defendant had to 
prove that the danger was unknowable. See Feldman, 479 A.2d at 388. 
 52 Crislip v. TCH Liquidating Co., 556 N.E.2d 1177, 1183-84 n.1 (Ohio 1990). 
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in those cases in which the defendant likely knew or should have 
known of the risk even without imputed knowledge.53 
Courts used several techniques in the incremental 
process of whittling away at strict liability for unknowable 
dangers. The first was simply to do so outright, the route taken 
by the Feldman court. Another was the foot in the door 
technique. In Brown v. Superior Court, the Supreme Court of 
California ruled that manufacturers of prescription 
pharmaceuticals should not be liable for failing to warn of 
unknowable dangers because of the damage the threat of such 
liability would do to the public interest in the development of 
new prescription drugs.54 The opinion, although carefully 
crafted to focus exclusively on the prescription drug industry, 
was extended to asbestos litigation in subsequent cases. In 
Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,55 the court ruled 
that asbestos manufacturers should not be liable for failing to 
warn of unknowable dangers.  Ignoring the difference between 
pharmaceuticals and asbestos, the Anderson court based its 
decision on the highly dubious ground that Brown was not 
confined to prescription pharmaceuticals.56 Other courts used 
similar arguments and tenuous analogies to avoid holding 
manufacturers liable for unknown dangers.57  
Yet another technique involved what I have called the 
fox versus fox terrier approach.58 This technique relied on 
  
 53 Richard L. Cupp, Jr. & Danielle Polage, The Rhetoric of Strict Products 
Liability versus Negligence: An Empirical Analysis, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 874, 896 (2002).  
 54 751 P.2d 470, 478-80 (Cal. 1988).  
 55 810 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1991). A prescription pharmaceutical might pass a risk-
utility test, even without a warning. Asbestos certainly does not. 
 56 Id. at 556-59. 
 57 Other courts have extended protection from liability for unknowable 
dangers beyond the field of prescription drugs. See, e.g., Transue v. Aesthetech Corp., 
341 F.3d 911 (9th Cir. 2003) (breast implants); Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 
1227, 1232 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that a pace maker can fall under comment k 
protection); Hufft v. Horowitz, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377, 378 (Ct. App. 1992) (extending 
Brown to implanted medical devices); Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 317 A.2d 392, 397 (N.J. 
1974) (holding that hepatitis-infected blood should be considered an “unavoidably 
unsafe product” as defined in comment k), aff’d, 332 A.2d 596 (N.J. 1975); Ruiz-
Guzman v. Amvac Chem. Corp., 7 P.3d 795 (Wash. 2000) (blanket protection for all 
medical products, but protection will be extended on a case-by-case basis for 
pesticides); Rogers v. Miles Labs., Inc., 802 P.2d 1346, 1347 (Wash. 1991) (extending 
comment k immunity to all blood and blood product cases); Terhune v. A.H. Robins Co., 
577 P.2d 975 (Wash. 1978) (extending comment k protection to include the Dalkon 
Shield, an internal contraceptive device); see also Hines v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 527 P.2d 
1075, 1077 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974) (implying extension of Restatement § 402A comment k 
protection to blood and, more specifically, blood infected with hepatitis).  
 58 This label is based on an essay by Stephen Jay Gould called “The Case of 
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comment j to § 402A, which many courts, quoting an edited 
version of this comment from other opinions in other 
jurisdictions, misinterpreted to allow liability only for failing to 
warn of knowable dangers. In applying this technique, a court 
would quote comment j to § 402A in support of the position that 
manufacturers should not be liable for failing to warn of 
unknowable dangers. As quoted by the courts,59 comment j 
provides: 
Where, however, the product * * * is one whose danger is not 
generally known, or if known is one which the consumer would 
reasonably not expect to find in the product, the seller is required to 
give warning against it, if he has knowledge, or by the application of 
  
the Creeping Fox Terrier Clone,” in which he discussed the problem presented when 
sequential sources simply quote from the preceding source, errors and all. The essay 
deals with an error about the size of eohippus that appeared in an early biology text; 
the error reappears through decades of texts because the subsequent authors all quote, 
in sequence, the error as quoted in the preceding text. Comment j to § 402A has been 
treated much as the evolutionary history of horses was treated in these texts. See 
STEPHEN JAY GOULD, BULLY FOR BRONTOSAURUS: REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL HISTORY 
155, 155-67 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1991).  
 59 Numerous courts have quoted comment j in this manner. See, e.g., 
Anderson v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 799 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1986); Vermeulen v. Armstrong 
World Indus., 204 Cal. App. 3d 1192, 1204 (Ct. App. 1988); Malin v. Union Carbide 
Corp., 530 A.2d 794, 798 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); Chrysler Corp. v. Batten, 450 
S.E.2d 208 (Ga. 1994) (utilizing quotation marks, the judge in this seatbelt failure case 
quotes comment j in a way so that he eliminates the ellipses and takes comment j 
completely out of the allergy context). Other courts picked up this version of comment j 
in their own opinions, citing preceding opinions as the source. This process may be 
traced as one follows an identical version from Zeigler v. CloWhite Co., 507 S.E.2d 182, 
184 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) and Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Ford, 461 S.E.2d 877, 898 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (stating “see also Restatement (2d) of Torts, § 402A, Comment j 
(seller is required to give warning ‘if he has knowledge, or by the application of 
reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have knowledge’ of the danger 
. . . .”)) into subsequent opinions, in which the identical quotation appeared. See 
Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co.,402 N.E.2d 194, 197 (Ill. 1980); Hickman v. Thomas C. 
Thompson Co., 644 F. Supp. 1531, 1537 (D. Colo. 1986). This case involved the 
inhalation of enamel dust: 
This argument is supported by comment j to § 402A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts (1965), which states, in applicable part, that “the seller is 
required to give warning . . . if he has knowledge, or by the application of 
reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have knowledge, of 
the presence of the ingredient and the danger.” 
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965)). In McElhaney v. 
Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F. Supp. 228, 231 (D. S.D. 1983) the court quoted comment j as 
follows: 
In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably dangerous, the 
seller may be required to give directions or warning . . . as to its use. . . . [T]he 
seller is required to give warning . . . if he has knowledge, or by the 
application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have 
knowledge, of the presence of . . . the danger. 
Id.; Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 386) (N.J. 1984); Vassallo v. Baxter 
Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 922 (Mass. 1998).  
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reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have 
knowledge, of the * * * danger. 
Unfortunately for the intellectual integrity of this 
analysis, however, comment j in fact says more.60 Comment j, 
without the careful ellipses, provides: 
Where, however, the product contains an ingredient to which a 
substantial number of the population are allergic, and the ingredient 
is one whose danger is not generally known, or if known is one which 
the consumer would reasonably not expect to find in the product, the 
seller is required to give warning against it, if he has knowledge, or 
by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and 
foresight should have knowledge, of the presence of the ingredient 
and the danger.61  
Comment j requires the seller to warn against 
ingredients that might provoke allergic reactions. As the 
antecedent of the word “it” in the fifth line of the above 
quotation is “ingredient,” not “danger,” the risk involved is the 
risk of an allergic reaction, not a general danger attached to 
use of the product.62 It seems, then, that the courts simply 
quoted comment j as quoted by each other, without reading the 
actual text of the comment. When one reads the actual text, 
one discovers that the comment is about allergic reactions and 
only about knowability insofar as an ingredient is known to 
  
 60 As the court pointed out in Sternhagen v. Dow Co., 935 P.2d 1139, 1142 
(Mont. 1997): 
Furthermore, the Chemical Companies rely on only one part of the third 
sentence of Comment j which, when considered in its entirety, indicated that 
this sentence is not applicable to the question certified to this Court. . . . The 
certified question before us involves an alleged cancer-causing ingredient, not 
one to which the decedent is alleged to have been allergic. Therefore, the 
third sentence of Comment j is not applicable to the certified question. 
Id. 
 61 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965). 
 62 The court noted the major flaw in the defendant’s argument that comment 
j provided immunity for unknowable dangers in In re Haw. Fed. Asbestos Cases, 665 F. 
Supp. 1454, 1458-59 & n.4 (D. Haw. 1986):  
Defendants believe that Hawaii will follow comment j, and that comment j 
allows the defense. I do not believe that the Court will follow comment j with 
the result that it overrides the consumer expectation test when the 
defendants could not have known of the products defects . . . . But the largest 
flaw in defendants’ argument is that comment j applies to products that 
cause allergic reactions. Comment j applies to common products, such as 
strawberries, eggs, and possibly cosmetics, that are otherwise safe yet cause 
allergic reactions. Obviously no one would consider asbestosis, lung cancer, or 
mesothelioma resulting from asbestos exposure an allergic reaction. 
Id. at 1458-59. 
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cause such an allergic reaction. Quite simply, the comment 
does not support the use to which the courts have put it.63  
Courts have employed a similar technique in using 
comment k to justify exempting pharmaceutical manufacturers 
from § 402A. Many happily held that comment k provided an 
exemption from the strictures of § 402A for prescription drugs 
because such drugs are unavoidably dangerous.64 Unfortunately 
for the intellectual integrity of such judicial analysis, comment 
k does not say this. Comment k, which again is almost never 
quoted in its entirety, provides:  
There are some products which, in the present state of human 
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended 
and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. 
An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of 
rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging 
consequences when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably 
leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the 
vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high 
degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, 
and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, 
nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other 
drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason 
cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or under the prescription 
of a physician. It is also true in particular of many new or 
experimental drugs as to which, because of lack of time and 
opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no 
assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but 
such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the 
drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The seller of 
such products, again with the qualification that they are properly 
prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the 
situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for 
unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he 
has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and 
desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable 
risk.65  
  
 63 Even when they quote comment j in its entirety, however, some courts 
persist in citing comment j as proof that the manufacturer is only liable for knowable 
dangers. This knowability requirement, along with comment j, was then applied to 
cases that had nothing to do with allergies or even pharmaceuticals. See, e.g., Crislip v. 
TCH Liquidating Co., 556 N.E.2d 1177, 1180 (Ohio 1990) (wood-burning furnace). In 
Crislip, while discussing failure to warn issues, the court cited comment j as supporting 
the general proposition that a manufacturer can only be held liable for failing to warn 
if the danger was knowable. Id. Although the court includes virtually all of the 
language of comment j, it italicizes the warning language for emphasis and completely 
ignores the language regarding allergies. Id.  
 64 See supra text accompanying note 37.  
 65 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965). 
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This language does not include an exemption from § 
402A for prescription pharmaceuticals. Far from it. Comment k 
provides no immunities at all. Rather, comment k by its own 
terms provides that manufacturers of prescription 
pharmaceuticals are not strictly liable for damages provided 
their drug passes a risk-utility test. The example provided in 
the comment itself is the Pasteur vaccine, which, although 
dangerous, is not defective as the disease that it is designed to 
prevent is hideously fatal. The Pasteur vaccine is dangerous, 
but not unreasonably so. Indeed, comment k invites the 
application of the risk-utility test to drugs; if the drug passes it, 
the drug is dangerous but not defective; if not, the drug is 
defective. It is also worth pointing out that a drug like the 
Pasteur vaccine would be nondefective even in the absence of 
any warning, because no consumer would reject the vaccine in 
spite of being warned.66 Comment k recognizes the existence of 
reasonably dangerous products. In order to be so classified, 
however, the product must pass a risk-utility test.  
Some courts simply ruled that there was no difference 
between failure to warn in negligence and failure to warn 
under § 402A.67 In doing so, these courts simply and explicitly 
abolished strict liability for failure to warn altogether. 
Manufacturers would only be liable for failing to warn under 
negligence doctrine. One court remarked: “After reviewing the 
authorities and comments on the failure to warn question, we 
believe any posited distinction between strict liability and 
negligence principles is illusory. We fail to see any distinction 
between negligence and strict liability in the analysis of those 
  
 66 See Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1273-74 (5th Cir. 1974) (noting 
the risk of contracting polio from the vaccine compared with risk of contracting polio 
without it).  
 67 Some jurisdictions required that manufacturers prove lack of knowability, 
while others simply divided failure to warn law from strict products liability and put it 
back into negligence. 
  The following are cases that require proof of lack of knowability: Oglesby v. 
Gen. Motors Corp., 190 F.3d 244, 252 (4th Cir. 1999); Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 402 
N.E.2d 194, 199 (Ill. 1980); Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 622 (Minn. 1984); 
Mauch v. Mfrs. Sales & Serv., Inc., 345 N.W.2d 338, 346 (N.D. 1984); Bragg v. Hi-
Ranger, Inc., 462 S.E.2d 321, 328 (S.C. 1995). 
  The following cases stand for the concept that the standard in strict 
liability is a negligence standard: Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 466 (7th 
Cir. 1984); Crislip, 556 N.E.2d at 1183 (“Thus, the standard imposed upon the 
defendant in a strict liability claim grounded upon an inadequate warning is the same 
as that imposed in a negligence claim based upon inadequate warning.”); Standhardt v. 
Flintkote Co., 508 P.2d 1283, 1290-91 (N.M. 1973); Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 
Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 782 (R.I. 1988).  
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jurisdictions injecting a knowledge requirement into their strict 
liability/ failure to warn equation.”68  
B.  The Consumer Expectation Test 
Like the imputed knowledge test, the consumer 
expectation test has nothing to do with a manufacturer’s 
knowledge of the danger. Rather, the test concerns whether the 
product performed as safely (or as unsafely) as a reasonable 
consumer would expect.  
As has often been documented,69 the consumer 
expectation test ran into problems from the start. As an initial 
matter, there may be no ascertainable consumer expectation 
for a particular product.70 Consumer expectation for a product 
may be too low, as is the case for products with obvious 
dangers.71 Conversely, consumer expectation for a product may 
be too high, as might be the case for prescription 
pharmaceuticals.72   
  
 68 Olson v. Prosoco, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 284, 289 (Iowa 1994). Not all courts 
abandoned the imputation of knowledge in such cases. Hawaii, for example, continued 
to impute knowledge irrespective of its knowability. See Johnson v. Raybestos-
Manhattan Inc., 740 P.2d 548, 549 (Haw. 1987). Massachusetts, which initially 
adhered to the imputation of knowledge, only abandoned its commitment to strict 
products liability in 1998, in Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 922-
23 (Mass. 1998), after other courts were returning to the Second Restatement.  
 69 See, e.g., Empire, supra note 33, at 1198.  
 70 Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d 806, 810 (Or. 1967). See also Gen. 
Motors Corp. v. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209, 1221 n.16 (Alaska 1998) (The Supreme 
Court of Alaska, discussing the possible shortcomings of the consumer expectations 
test and citing Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 306 (Cal. 1994), stated “Soule 
did recognize, however, that some products may be so unfamiliar to the average 
consumer that it would be difficult to form any intelligent expectations about how they 
should perform.”). 
 71 If the consumer expectation test governed, no product with an obvious 
danger could be defective. Courts have uniformly rejected this argument, holding that 
products with obvious dangers, while they passed a consumer expectation test, might 
still fail a risk-utility test. See, e.g., Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., No. L-84-125, 1987 WL 
6486, at *35-36 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 9, 1987) (punch press). 
 72 A reasonable consumer might expect a vaccine to be without risks when it 
cannot be so and should not be ruled defective simply because it is dangerous. Such a 
product might pass a risk-utility test. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A 
cmt. k (1965); see also Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1273-74 (5th Cir. 1974): 
Although the living virus in the vaccine does not make the vaccine defective, 
it does make it what the Restatement calls an “unavoidably unsafe product”, 
one which cannot be made “safe” no matter how carefully it is manufactured. 
Such products are not necessarily “unreasonably dangerous”, for as this 
Court has long recognized in wrestling with product liability questions, many 
goods possess both utility and danger. . . . Applying this standard here, the 
scales must tip in favor of availability. The evil to be prevented–poliomyelitis 
and its accompanying paralysis–is great. Although the danger that vaccinees 
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Many courts dodged the problems presented by the 
consumer expectation test by abolishing it or reconstruing it as 
a risk-utility test.73 Thus, as the Phillips court declared,74 the 
reasonable consumer would be held to expect the product that a 
reasonable manufacturer would produce. Otherwise, the 
reasonable consumer would perform an increasingly 
hypothetical risk-utility balancing test on the product—the 
same test the manufacturer would perform. The pure 
reasonable consumer test fell into desuetude in the same case-
by-case process that led to the abolition of liability for 
unknowable dangers. 
The shift away from the consumer expectation test was 
initially motivated by the need for a standard that would 
protect consumers from products that passed the consumer 
expectation test because they were obviously dangerous. This is 
clear in Barker v. Lull Engineering and ensuing cases: courts 
perceived a need for a standard of defectiveness that would 
leave room for a design to be defective even if the product were 
no more dangerous than a reasonable consumer would expect.75  
  
may contract polio is qualitatively devastating, it is statistically miniscule. 
On balance then, marketing the vaccine is justified despite the danger. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 73 Flemister v. Gen. Motors Corp., 723 So. 2d 25, 27 (Ala. 1998) (concluding 
that the appropriate standard in a crashworthiness case was a test that, although 
referred to as a consumer expectation test, was a hybrid test including risk-utility 
factors and the requirement of proof of a reasonable alternative design). The Justices in 
Flemister stated: 
“Consumer expectation,” considered in the context of the entire text of [the 
relevant jury instruction], is not the exclusive test by which a jury evaluates 
an alleged design defect. Rather, the term “consumer expectation” . . . states 
only one factor of a standard that acknowledges a consumer’s reasonable 
expectations as to the intended purpose of the automobile; [applicable law] 
also requires proof of the attendant risk and utility of the automobile’s design 
and of any available design alternatives, from which proof a jury could 
reasonably conclude that the automobile’s design was defective. 
723 So. 2d at 27; see also Miele v. Am. Tobacco Co., 770 N.Y.S.2d 386, 391 (App. Div. 
2003):  
While the dissent herein suggests that New York applies a consumer 
expectations test to design defect causes of action, the Court of Appeals made 
clear in Denny v. Ford Motor Co. (87 N.Y.2d 248, 662 N.E.2d 730, 639 
N.Y.S.2d 250), that the determination of whether a design defect is actionable 
requires a balancing of risks and utilities of the product, with the consumer’s 
degree of awareness of the product’s potential danger but one factor to 
consider in that analysis.  
Id. 
 74 Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036-37 (Or. 1974). 
 75 Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 454 (Cal. 1978) (“[A] product may 
be found defective in design, even if it satisfies ordinary consumer expectations, if 
through hindsight the jury determines that the product’s design embodies ‘excessive 
preventable danger,’ or, in other words, if the jury finds that the risk of danger 
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Numerous California decisions have implicitly recognized this fact 
and have made clear, through varying linguistic formulations, that a 
product may be found defective in design, even if it satisfies ordinary 
consumer expectations, if through hindsight the jury determines 
that the product’s design embodies “excessive preventable danger,” 
or, in other words, if the jury finds that the risk of danger inherent 
in the challenged design outweighs the benefits of such design.76 
In other cases, consumer expectation tests were either 
rejected or transformed into a risk-utility test in order to allow 
complex products, about which consumers could have no 
reasonable expectation, to be ruled defective.77 Thus, necessary 
refinements in the consumer expectation test were made in 
order to allow liability in a broader group of cases than the test, 
literally applied, would have permitted.78  
All of this led to the consumer expectation test becoming 
increasingly disfavored. Some courts abandoned it altogether in 
favor of a risk-utility test.79 Of course, this abandonment does 
  
inherent in the challenged design outweighs the benefits of such design.”); Collazo-
Santiago v. Toyota Motor Corp., 937 F. Supp. 134, 137-39 (D.P.R. 1996) (holding that 
Puerto Rico would adopt the two-prong Barker test which would allow a jury to find a 
product defective even if the product meets an ordinary consumer’s expectations); 
Caterpillar Tractor v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 884 (Alaska 1979) (adopting the Barker two-
prong test, the Supreme Court of Alaska stated “[i]n view of the diversity of product 
deficiencies which could fall within the notion of defect, we are persuaded that the 
Barker two-prong test provides the most comprehensive guidelines for instructing 
juries, without compromising any of the goals of strict liability.”); Ontai v. Straub 
Clinic & Hosp., Inc., 659 P.2d 734, 740 (Haw. 1983) (holding that the Barker test would 
be applied in the jurisdiction of Hawaii). 
 76 Barker, 573 P.2d at 454. 
 77 Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 879 (Ariz. 1985) (holding that the 
consumer expectation test applies in cases where the consumer could have formed an 
expectation. “Where the consumer expectation test is inappropriate [because the 
consumer has none], the question of defective and unreasonably dangerous condition 
may be determined by applying Wade’s risk/benefit factors . . . .”). But see Clay v. Ford 
Motor Co., 215 F.3d 663, 669 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that although Ohio statute 
previously provided for both the risk-utility test and the consumer expectation test, an 
amendment to the statute in 1998 eliminated the consumer expectation test from 
consideration in products designed after January 27, 1997). 
 78 That group of cases in which consumer expectations were unrealistically 
high did not play a major role in the changing of the test for defectiveness. Most of 
those cases involved prescription pharmaceuticals, and courts tended to deal with drug 
manufacturers under warning, not design, law. Comment k provides an example of 
such a product in the form of the Pasteur rabies vaccine. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965), as does Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(polio vaccine).  
 79 See Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 942 F.2d 210, 215 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating 
that “the fact finder can only determine whether design was defective after hearing 
evidence about what designs were feasible the time the product was manufactured and 
whether they were in fact safer.”); Beck, 593 P.2d at 885 (stating that once plaintiff has 
shown that the injury was proximately caused by the product, defendant can avoid 
liability by proving that the benefits of the design outweighed the risk of danger); 
Barker, 573 P.2d at 457-58 (defining defect through a combination of consumer 
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not in itself eliminate liability for unknowable dangers, 
because the risk-utility test, like imputed knowledge and 
consumer expectation, has nothing to do with knowability. 
Rather, the risk-utility test involves weighing the product as it 
was, and no party’s knowledge of the danger—whether plaintiff 
or defendant—is relevant to this process.  
C.  Reasonable Alternative Design 
Section 402A did not require that the plaintiff prove the 
existence of a reasonable alternative design as an element of 
defectiveness. To be sure, many courts were reluctant to rule 
that a design could be defective without proof that it could be 
made safer,80 but not all held that a reasonable alternative 
design was a sine qua non of design defect under § 402A.81 Some 
commentators, however, took the position that liability in the 
absence of an alternative feasible design, (which they called 
“product category liability”), was tantamount to liability 
without defect.82 This characterization is inaccurate and 
theoretically unsound. Liability in the absence of an alternative 
feasible design is liability without defect if and only if defect is 
defined as requiring an alternative feasible design. If defect is 
defined in terms of a risk-utility test, the existence of an 
alternative feasible design may be a factor in weighing the 
product’s usefulness and dangers, but is not a requirement for 
engaging in the weighing process.83 A product must pass a risk-
  
expectation test and risk-utility balancing analysis).  
 80 Kotler v. Am. Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217, 1225 (1st Cir. 1990) (“[T]he 
existence of a safer alternative design is a sine qua non for the imposition of liability. . . 
. It is illogical to say that a product is defective . . . when ‘defect’ has historically been 
measured in reference to the availability, or at least the feasibility of safer 
alternatives.”), vacated, 505 U.S. 1215 (1992) (for further consideration in light of 
Cipollone), aff’d on reh’g, 981 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1992); Miller v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 679 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (granting summary judgment where 
plaintiff failed to allege that cigarettes were capable of being safely designed), aff’d, 
856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1988); Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985) 
(declining to impose strict liability under doctrine of abnormally dangerous activity 
upon manufacturer and marketer of a handgun and holding that the risk-utility strict 
liability test was inapplicable). 
 81 Couch v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 728 P.2d 585, 586 (Wash. 1986) (The 
availability of a reasonable alternative design is “not a necessary element of a 
plaintiff’s burden” in a design defect action.). 
 82 These commentators include Professors Henderson and Twerski, who were 
the Reporters for the Third Restatement. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. 
Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability 
Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263 (1991). 
 83 As one court stated: 
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utility test in order to be nondefective; it can pass (or fail) such 
a test whether there is or is not an alternative feasible design. 
An unavoidably unsafe product, even one bearing a warning, 
can still be tested under a risk-utility standard.84 Holding such 
a product nondefective solely because it is unavoidably unsafe 
is illogical, as the risks may still outweigh the benefits of the 
unavoidably unsafe product. Useful, unavoidably unsafe 
products may well be nondefective; useless ones should not be 
exempt from defective status simply because they cannot be 
made safer.85 Be this as it may, courts tended to allow 
themselves to be persuaded that liability in the absence of an 
alternative feasible design was liability without defect,86 even 
  
Defendants argue that in order to recover, Plaintiffs should have been 
required to prove there was a safer alternative design; there is no such 
requirement under Michigan law. The existence of, or lack of a safer 
alternative design, may have been relevant, but it is not dispositive in the 
sense that such proof is necessary to make out a prima facie case or in the 
sense that the court should have decided the issue as a matter of law. The 
trial court correctly instructed that there may be more than one proximate 
cause and that defendants’ conduct need only be a proximate cause in order 
for plaintiffs to recover. 
Leichtamer v. Am. Motors Corp., No. 5223, 1980 Ohio App. LEXIS 13923, at *36 (Ohio 
Ct. App. July 30, 1980) (citing Anderson, Admr. v. Volkswagenwerk & Traverse 
Motors, Inc., Case No. 31230); see also Timmons v. Ford Motor Co., 982 F. Supp. 1475, 
1479 (S.D. Ga. 1997) (Although the Georgia Supreme Court refers to proof of the 
existence of an alternative design in design defect cases as the “heart of a design defect 
analysis,” alternative designs are only one factor in the analysis.); Pease v. Am. 
Cyanamid, 795 F. Supp. 755, 759 (D. Md. 1992) (proof of an alternative design is one of 
seven factors to be weighed in the balancing test to determine if a product can be 
considered unreasonably dangerous); Newman v. Ford Motor Co., 975 S.W.2d 147, 152-
53 (Mo. 1998) (declining to incorporate into the jury instructions the Third 
Restatement’s requirement of a reasonable alternative design). 
 84 Some products are unavoidably unsafe, and can be rendered non-defective 
by the addition of a warning. The mere presence of a warning, however, should not 
automatically mean that the product passes a risk-utility test, particularly where the 
warning provides information that does not render the product safe, but which rather 
informs the consumer about dangers that inhere in the normal use of the product. See 
Rogers v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 144 F.3d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 85 Ellen Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets in their Eyes, Product Category 
Liability and Alternative Feasible Designs in the Third Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 
1429, 1435 (1994). 
 86 See Miller v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 679 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. 
Pa. 1988), aff’d, 856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that plaintiff’s claim that 
cigarettes were incapable of being designed safely precluded a design defect charge); 
Kelley v. R.G. Indus., 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985) (declining to impose strict liability 
under the doctrine of abnormally dangerous activity upon manufacturer and marketer 
of a handgun and holding that the risk-utility strict liability test was inapplicable). For 
more recent cases, see Quintana-Ruiz v. Hyundai Motor Corp., 303 F.3d 63, 71 (1st Cir. 
2002); Lederman v. Pac. Indus., 119 F.3d 551, 555 n.5 (7th Cir. 1997); Bravman v. 
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 794 F. Supp. 96, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d in part and rev’d 
in part, 984 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1993); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp., 981 F.2d 136, 144 (4th Cir. 1992). 
  But see Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products 
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though this meant exempting manufacturers of highly 
dangerous/low utility products from liability.  
As is the case with unknowable dangers, the idea of a 
reasonable alternative design has implications for the 
consumer expectation test for defect. If the consumer 
expectation test is used, the court simply asks whether the 
product was as safe as a reasonable consumer would expect. 
This question has nothing to do with either knowability of the 
danger or availability of an alternative feasible design: the 
question is simply whether the product was as safe as expected 
by the consumer. Thus, neither unknowability nor lack of a 
reasonable alternative design should constitute a defense for 
the manufacturer under the consumer expectation test. It 
should come as no surprise, then, that the Third Restatement 
does not include a consumer expectation test for design or 
warning defect.87   
  
Liability Section 2(b): The Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 61 TENN. L. 
REV. 1407, 1428 (1994) (“The centerpiece of the proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability is the requirement that the plaintiff present evidence of a reasonable 
alternative design as part of her prima facie case. This requirement is not supported by 
the majority of the jurisdictions that have considered the question.”). 
  Efforts to foreclose liability in the absence of an alternative feasible design 
have not been restricted to the courts. Legislatures have enacted statutes defining 
products liability to exclude liability in the absence of such a design. See Brown v. 
Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 506, 520-24 (D.N.J. 2002) (discussing the 
application of one such statute as applied to cigarettes). The New Jersey Product 
Liability Act foreclosed liability both in the absence of an alternative feasible design 
and in the presence of consumer expectation of the danger. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-
3a (West 2000). Other jurisdictions have adopted statutes to protect manufacturers of 
guns and ammunition, as well as cigarettes. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-11 (2001). 
Significantly, North Carolina’s statute was enacted in 1987, the period when strict 
products liability was being curtailed nationally.  Id. 
 87 Mismanufactured products almost by definition fail a consumer 
expectation test, and the Third Restatement has left the law applicable to such 
products alone. Res ipsa loquitur applies to mismanufactured products, and not to any 
other type of defect. This leads to the fascinating problem of classifying products as 
defective by reason of mismanufacture or design; as Professor Twerski himself has 
implied, one cannot always tell from what type of defect a product suffers. See Alvin S. 
Weinstein, Aaron D. Twerski, Henry R. Piehler  & William A. Donaher, Product 
Liability: An Interaction of Law and Technology, 12 DUQ. L. REV. 425, 430-31 (1974) 
(product might be defective in either design or manufacture, or neither, because “all 
products are flawed at some technological level”). The implications of the classification 
are potentially vast; however, the plaintiff must prove an alternative feasible design if 
the claim is one of design defect, but need only prove that the product caused the injury 
and that it should not have done so if the claim is one of mismanufacture. See, e.g., 
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on Defective 
Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 867, 869-70 (1998).   
[B]oth legal commentators and the practicing bar muddied the waters by 
confusing the issue of the standard for design defect with other issues that 
have little or nothing directly to do with the standard, such as the issue of 
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This article now sets the stage for the Third 
Restatement of Products Liability. It turns to the eve of the 
Third Restatement, and analyzes where the legal permutations 
of § 402A discussed above had landed the law as the Third 
Restatement drafting process began. 
D.  The Eve of the Third Restatement: The Special Problem 
of Unknowable Dangers 
The decimation of strict products liability was greeted 
with enthusiasm by many scholars, including Professors 
Henderson and Twerski, the Reporters for the Third 
Restatement, who had been opposed to liability without fault 
from the start.88 These eminent scholars were appointed to be 
the reporters for the Third Restatement of Torts, and they 
enthusiastically embraced what they viewed as a judicial trend 
towards reshaping strict products liability into negligence-
based liability.89 
It is worth noting that the courts that abolished the 
imputation of knowledge in cases involving unknowable 
dangers focused exclusively on the perceived unfairness to the 
defendants of holding them liable for failing to do something 
they could not, by definition, have done. In their zeal to protect 
manufacturing endeavors, the courts ignored or glossed over 
the unfairness to the plaintiffs in leaving them with costs they 
could not, also by definition, have avoided.90 Strict products 
liability stands for the idea that the party that designed, sold, 
marketed and profited from the product should pay for the 
injuries it causes as a cost of doing business.91 However unfair 
  
whether the producer should be liable when a design conforms with the best 
technology available at the time of sale. 
Id. at 871. 
 88 For an extensive listing of articles written by Professors Henderson and 
Twerski, see Jerry J. Phillips, Achilles’ Heel, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1265, 1265 n.3 (1994).  
 89 Not everyone agreed that there was any such trend. John Vargo presented 
strong evidence to the contrary in his monumental article. John F. Vargo, The 
Emperor’s New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a “New Cloth” for Section 
402A Products Liability Design Defects—A Survey of the States Reveals a Different 
Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 493 (1996). Vargo claims that the reporters of the Third 
Restatement overstated the strength of the precedents on which they relied. 
 90 One of the original policy reasons driving the imposition of strict liability 
was that it “insure[d] that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are 
borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the 
injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.” Greenman v. Yuba Power 
Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963).  
 91 See Mark. C. RAHDERT, COVERING ACCIDENT COSTS: INSURANCE, LIABILITY, 
AND TORT REFORM 73-74 (1995). 
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it may appear to hold a manufacturer liable for failing to warn 
of an unknowable danger, it is surely more unfair to leave the 
costs of the injury on the plaintiff. Allowing manufacturers to 
escape liability imposes a subsidy of their manufacturing 
efforts on whatever entity gets left with the costs. This result is 
indefensible both morally and economically.  
The Third Restatement, by codifying this subsidy, also 
brought it judicial attention. As the following analysis will 
demonstrate, however, proponents of eliminating strict 
products liability would probably have been better off leaving 
their views uncodified. 
As previously discussed, the basis for the fairly 
wholesale retreat from imposing liability for unknowable 
dangers lay in the idea that liability for failing to warn of 
unknowable dangers would be absolute. If the test is whether a 
manufacturer acted reasonably in not warning of knowable 
dangers, defenses are few and far between, because what 
factfinder would conclude that a reasonable manufacturer, 
knowing of the danger, would fail to warn about it? The courts 
could see no defenses that would protect the manufacturer 
from liability in such a scenario, and thus began the retreat 
from strict products liability. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court’s highly disingenuous 
opinion in Feldman exemplifies the dismay of the courts when 
confronted with the fruition of their adoption of strict products 
liability, and the possibility that a manufacturer might have no 
defenses when charged with failing to warn of an unknowable 
danger. In design cases, the manufacturer can argue with at 
least a chance of success that the product, dangers aside, 
passes a risk-utility test. This is the case when a product has a 
high utility and cannot be made safe. The idea that there are 
reasonably dangerous products comes as a corollary to the idea 
that some products are unreasonably dangerous. Any product 
that is dangerous, but whose utility outweighs its dangers, is 
nondefective. As mentioned in Part I, examples include knives, 
automobiles (with available safety technology), and ladders 
(ditto). A product whose dangers cause it to fail a risk-utility 
test, like a sander without teeth, is defective.  
The problem in warning cases is that the risk-utility 
calculus is different than in design cases. A challenged design 
may pass a risk-utility test because its design cannot be altered 
in such a way as to reduce or eliminate the danger. Warnings, 
however, are both inexpensive and easy to include with or on a 
product, at least in theory. A product with a warning will 
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inevitably be safer than a product without one,92 and it seems 
easy, at least with hindsight, to conclude that the product 
should have contained a warning.  Courts, egged on by 
defendants, concluded that factfinders would reason as follows:  
1. The product was dangerous, even though the 
manufacturer did not know of the danger. 
2. Knowledge of the danger is imputed to the 
manufacturer. 
3. Any reasonable person knowing of the danger would 
have put a warning of the danger onto the product. 
4. There was no warning on the product. 
5. Therefore, the product was defective and the 
manufacturer is liable. 
Thus, courts decided that imputing knowledge of the 
danger to the manufacturer was inappropriate, because the 
imputation would lead to automatic liability in failure to warn 
cases. 
In design defect cases, manufacturers can defend 
themselves by arguing that the danger (knowledge of which is 
imputed) was not curable, at least not without destroying the 
product or rendering it useless or prohibitively expensive, and 
thus that there was no feasible alternative design.  The product 
may pass a risk-utility test in the absence of an ability to 
eliminate or reduce the dangers, meaning that the product, 
although dangerous, was reasonably so given the “state of the 
art” of the technology at the time it was released, and therefore 
was not defective.93 This “state of the art” defense applies solely 
to design cases. No truly analogous defense is immediately 
apparent in warning cases: there is nothing uninventable about 
a warning, and it is almost always possible to convey one, 
(although perhaps not a useful one). The Feldman court viewed 
unknowability in warning cases as analogous to the lack of 
ability to make a safer product in design cases, concluding that 
unknowability should be a defense in failure to warn cases.94 
  
 92 At the very least, a warning will inform the consumer about dangers in the 
product, and, if these dangers are unavoidable, permit an informed choice as to use of 
that product. 
 93 This is not the same as requiring an alternative feasible design for the 
product. The product is still tested under a risk-utility standard, but it must pass or 
fail that test as it is, in the absence of an alternative feasible design. 
 94 This is what the court must have meant when it said “similarly, as to 
warning[] [cases].” Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 386 (N.J. 1984). See also 
Becker v. Baron Bros., 649 A.2d 613, 616-17 (N.J. 1994), in which the court analogized 
the state-of-the-art defense in warning cases to the risk-utility arguments of design 
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Other courts were all too eager to adopt the state of the art 
defense in its warning cases guise, pursuant to which the 
defendant would be allowed to argue that it was not feasible to 
warn of the danger because the danger was unknowable. This, 
of course, created a defense to strict products liability, 
effectively eliminating the aspect that set it apart from 
negligence-based liability in the first place. The only distinction 
that remained was the allocation of the burden of proof.  
The courts that embraced this analogy—that feasible 
alternative design is to design defect as knowability of danger 
defense is to failure to warn cases—missed the point of strict 
products liability completely. Not only did this result leave 
plaintiffs paying for injuries caused by manufacturers, it also 
provided support for an unworkable analogy. Courts forgot the 
most important part of strict products liability: the risk-utility 
test. A dangerous product is not necessarily defective: it is only 
defective if its risk is higher than its utility. Many of the 
products that courts ruled defective in the absence of warnings 
might not have been ruled defective at all, because their utility 
might well have outweighed their dangers, even without a 
warning. The dangerous aspect of the product must have also 
caused injury, another aspect of strict products liability 
neglected by the courts, at least in this context. If the presence 
of a warning on a product would not have affected the use to 
which the consumer put that product, then it is not defective 
for failure to warn. Therefore, whether an injury was 
“discoverable” at the time of manufacture should have no 
bearing on whether the benefit of the product outweighs its 
risk, and should not provide a defense. Such a determination is 
completely irrelevant to defect. 
A better analogy appears in the realm of informed 
consent. The question in informed consent is: would a 
reasonable patient, knowing of the undisclosed risk, have 
elected the procedure anyway? The answer to this question is 
often “yes.” For example, the plaintiff sues when he or she 
develops polio after being vaccinated or after being exposed to 
someone who was. The risk of developing polio from the vaccine 
was not disclosed to the patient. Would a reasonable person, 
knowing of the risk, have undergone the vaccination anyway? 
It is perfectly possible that the answer to this is yes, and may 
  
defect. 
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even be “yes” as a matter of law.95 In fact, many informed 
consent cases founder on precisely this causation shoal.96 
Analogously, a court can decide that a product is not defective 
as a matter of law, if there is a risk that a jury will impose 
liability for a reasonably dangerous product.97 
The risk-utility test and causation standards generate 
two defenses in strict products liability cases. The first is the 
argument that the product, even without a warning, was not 
defective. Of course, having a warning would have been better, 
but its absence might not make the product defective because 
the product, even without a warning, might be of such high 
utility that the failure to warn pales in significance. The second 
is the argument that the plaintiff=s decision to use the product 
did not depend on the warning. Had the plaintiff been warned, 
he or she would have used the product anyway.  The absence of 
the warning does not make the product defective unless the 
product without the warning fails a risk-utility test and the 
absence of the warning affected the plaintiff=s decision to use 
the product in the first place.  
The irony of the demise of strict products liability, then, 
is that all this retreating was unnecessary. It centered on a 
fundamental mistake, an idea that defendants and many 
scholars were able to sell to the courts. This idea was that 
holding manufacturers strictly liable for failing to warn of 
unknowable dangers was tantamount to absolute liability and 
liability without defect. Manufacturers persuaded the courts 
that they would be irretrievably damaged and unfairly affected 
by such “absolute” liability. It is, after all, impossible to warn of 
an unknowable danger.  
Thus, the courts were frightened into believing that 
liability for unknowable dangers was a form of absolute 
liability: liability without defect. They were encouraged in this 
belief by legions of articles, many authored by extremely 
distinguished law professors, many of whom had, from the 
start, opposed liability without fault,98 who successfully 
  
 95 See Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974).  
 96 See Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 408 N.W.2d 355, 362 (Iowa 
1987) (holding that since informing the patient about a remote risk of death would not 
have affected her decision whether to undergo the procedure, the failure to inform the 
patient of the risk was not causally linked to her death). 
 97 See Jordan v. K-Mart Corp., 611 A.2d 1328, 1331-32 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) 
(holding the sled is dangerous but not defective). 
 98 See, e.g., John L. Diamond, Eliminating the “Defect” in Design Strict 
Products Liability Theory, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 529 (1983); James A. Henderson, Jr. & 
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persuaded the courts that liability for unknowable dangers was 
absolute, and unfair, liability. The syllogism worked like this: 
1. Strict products liability had never been intended to 
impose absolute liability. 
2. Liability for unknowable dangers was liability 
without defect, and therefore absolute. 
3. Strict products liability should not impose liability 
for unknowable dangers. 
Understandably, the vast majority of courts, when 
confronted by the issue as presented above, ruled that 
manufacturers were not liable for unknowable dangers. This 
process was perhaps assisted by the fact that the opinions in 
which the original tests for defect had been developed all 
involved products with eminently knowable dangers. Thus, the 
courts were not only willing to reject what had been 
conceptualized as absolute liability, they were able to do so 
without disturbing precedent, using lack of knowability as a 
means of distinguishing the case before them from prior cases 
under § 402A. 
The flaw in this analysis is that liability for failing to 
warn requires that the product be defective in order for the 
manufacturer to be held liable, an aspect ignored by those who 
argue that liability for failing to warn of unknowable dangers is 
absolute. Liability for unknowable dangers is liability without 
defect if and only if defect is defined as including only 
foreseeable (knowable) dangers.  The original tests for defect, of 
course, included no such requirement. All of the tests defined 
defect in what came to be viewed as risk-utility terms. In other 
words, a product is defective if it fails a risk-utility test, no 
matter who knew what, when, about the product. A 
manufacturer will not be liable for dangerous products, only for 
defective ones. Liability is only absolute if the manufacturer is 
held liable for all injuries caused by a dangerous product; it is 
not absolute if the manufacturer is held liable only for all 
injuries caused by a defective product.  
  
Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of 
Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263; James A Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. 
Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 
65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265 (1990); John W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of 
Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734 (1983). For a more 
complete listing of articles written by Henderson and Twerski see Jerry J. Phillips, 
Achilles’ Heel, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1265, 1265 n.3 (1994). 
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Confusion between the concepts of dangerousness and 
defectiveness fed the terror of absolute liability.99 But whether 
the danger was knowable or not, no manufacturer should be 
liable unless that danger made the product defective—unless 
the product failed a risk-utility test. Many of the products at 
issue in the courts’ retreat from strict products liability—
prescription pharmaceuticals—were probably not defective at 
all, because they would have passed a risk-utility test with or 
without a warning. But since the courts were muddled about 
the difference between dangerousness and defectiveness, they 
never performed any kind of risk-utility test on these products, 
preferring instead to dismiss the cases on the ground that 
manufacturers could not be found liable for failing to warn of 
unknowable dangers.  
It is perhaps worth reiterating that no court in the 
process of the retreat pointed out that the danger had been 
unknown to the consumer as well, and that their refusal to 
impose liability left the costs on the consumer. Refusing to hold 
manufacturers liable does not make the costs go away; it 
simply imposes them on someone else. Emphasizing the need 
for an uninhibited pharmaceutical industry allowed courts to 
sacrifice individual plaintiffs for the greater good, without 
analyzing whether liability was appropriate in the first place.100 
In many cases, the drug would probably have passed a risk-
utility test, perhaps as a matter of law; alternatively, the 
plaintiff might have been unable to show that the presence of a 
warning would have had an impact on the plaintiff=s conduct. 
In order to avoid imposing liability for dangerous, but 
non-defective products, courts, encouraged by various 
academics and economic recessions,101 discarded strict products 
liability altogether. As I have said in earlier articles, the 
requirement that the danger be foreseeable basically 
eliminates liability without negligence: if the danger were 
foreseeable, the manufacturer who fails adequately to perform 
a risk-utility test on the product was negligent in its design 
  
 99 See Ellen Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets in Their Eyes: Product Category 
Liability and Alternative Feasible Designs in the Third Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 
1429, 1441 (1994) (“‘[D]angerousness’ represents a factual characteristic of a product, 
while ‘defectiveness’ is a legal conclusion about that product.”); Empire, supra note 34, 
at 1187 (concluding that defectiveness liability is about responsibility rather than 
blame).  
 100 There was also no empirical evidence that pharmaceutical companies were 
in fact inhibited by strict products liability. 
 101 See RAHDERT, supra, note 93, at 159-61. 
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and/or marketing. In other words, under this theory of 
foreseeability a product is defective when the manufacturer has 
acted unreasonably in the face of a known danger. This is 
negligence, not strict products liability. 
It also follows that if, as many courts state, imputing 
knowledge of the danger is the hallmark of strict products 
liability, reinstating the requirement that the danger be 
foreseeable eliminates the imputation of knowledge in all cases 
in which the imputation is result determinative. This includes 
all cases where the danger was unknowable at the time of 
manufacture. With this approach, plaintiffs will lose all cases 
involving unknowable dangers. They can win all others under a 
negligence theory, and the availability of a strict liability 
theory will not determine the result.  
III.  THE THIRD RESTATEMENT AND THE RESPONSE  
As predicted, the Third Restatement codified the 
abolition of the imputation of knowledge by defining defects in 
terms of foreseeable risks.102 This, of course, does away with 
liability for unknowable dangers in all circumstances. The 
Third Restatement also established a risk-utility test as the 
sole criterion for defect, eliminating any consumer expectation 
test from the definition of defect, and it added the requirement 
that the plaintiff prove a reasonable alternative design as a 
“centerpiece.”103  As Professor Owen observed: 
  
 102 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 (1998). This section provides, in 
relevant part: 
Categories of Product Defect 
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it 
contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is 
defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings. A 
product: 
. . . . 
(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed 
by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption 
of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor, 
or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the 
omission of the alternative design renders the product not 
reasonably safe;  
(c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when 
the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been 
reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or 
warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the 
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the 
instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe. 
 103 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2(b) (1998); Frank J. Vandall, The 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 2(b): The Reasonable 
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The requirements of “foreseeability” and “reasonableness” in 
subsections 2(b) and 2(c) effectively reconvert the products liability 
standard for these types of cases to one of negligence—a rather 
remarkable retreat from section 402A=s explicitly “strict” standard of 
liability of the Second Restatement that most courts boldly 
purported to apply to design and warnings cases for thirty years. 
Thus, . . . subsections 2(b) and 2(c) of the Third Restatement 
abandon the strict liability concept and employ negligence principles 
in design and warnings cases.104 
The use of the word “purported” by Professor Owen is 
particularly relevant, given that courts had whittled away at 
the imputation of knowledge and the consumer expectation test 
over the years. The Third Restatement, however, made it 
impossible for courts to ignore what they had done, and many 
did not like what they saw.105 
In one of the supreme ironies of modern tort 
jurisprudence, upon meeting the Third Restatement, many 
courts took a step back from what they had cavalierly 
accomplished in abolishing the imputation of knowledge of 
unknowable risks, and realized that there was no need to rule 
out liability for such dangers. As this Part will show, many 
decisions rejecting the Third Restatement and reinstating 
strict products liability might have been decided differently 
without it. In confronting the fact that manufacturers were 
avoiding paying for injuries they caused,  courts realized the 
implications of requiring foreseeability, eliminating the 
consumer expectation element, and demanding a reasonable 
alternative design in order for liability to result. Many 
rediscovered that letting manufacturers off the hook does not 
make the costs go away. It simply leaves them on another 
innocent party—the plaintiff. The Third Restatement sent 
courts back to the roots of strict products liability, to the idea 
that, as between two faultless entities, the party who caused 
the injury, who designed the product, who sold it, who profited 
from its availability, should pay for the injuries it caused. This 
article takes the position that without its opponents pushing 
  
Alternative Design Requirement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1407, 1428 (1994). 
 104 David Owen, Products Liability Law Restated, 49 S.C. L. REV. 273, 285 
(1998). 
 105 Some courts, of course, followed the Third Restatement, even in the face of 
their own prior precedent that would have required its rejection. See Vassallo v. Baxter 
Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 910 (Mass. 1998) (rejecting earlier Massachusetts 
law to follow Third Restatement). 
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too far, too fast, this resurgence in strict liability might never 
have happened. 
The Third Restatement tried to transform strict 
products liability into negligence—based liability in three 
relevant respects: unknowable dangers, consumer expectation, 
and the reasonable alternative design requirement. The first, 
liability for unknowable dangers, was eliminated by requiring 
foreseeability of danger as an element of defect. The second, 
consumer expectation, was eliminated by the adoption of an 
exclusive risk-utility test for defect. The third, liability in the 
absence of a reasonable alternative design, was eliminated by 
the requirement that the plaintiff prove that the product could 
have been made safer.  
This article now turns to these three subjects by 
examining their treatment under the Third Restatement and 
subsequent court opinions addressing their role in products 
liability. 
A.  Unknowable Dangers 
The Third Restatement requires that dangers be 
“foreseeable” in both design and warning contexts before the 
product can be found defective. By including foreseeability in 
the definition of defect, the Third Restatement foreclosed any 
liability for unknowable dangers in either the design or 
warning context. The pronouncement that strict products 
liability for unknowable dangers is dead may have been 
premature, however. Judging from many of the opinions that 
have been handed down since, the Third Restatement seems to 
have constituted some sort of a wake up call, although not the 
call its Reporters intended. 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in refusing to exempt 
manufacturers from liability for unknowable dangers, 
implicitly rejected the Third Restatement’s call for just such an 
exemption. The court in Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 
pointed out that “[f]oreseeability of harm is an element of 
negligence. . . . In other words, strict products liability imposes 
liability without regard to negligence and its attendant factors 
of duty of care and foreseeability [of danger].”106 Nor does 
liability for unknowable dangers constitute absolute liability: 
  
 106 629 N.W.2d 727, 745-46 (Wis. 2001). The use by the plaintiff must be 
foreseeable, but the danger need not be. Id. at 747. 
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the plaintiff must prove the product defective as well as 
dangerous.107 
It is perfectly correct to argue that the products liability 
goal of enhancing product safety is not particularly well served 
(if at all) by imposing liability for unknowable dangers. But the 
conclusion that this lack of congruence justifies eliminating 
liability for unknowable dangers altogether only follows if 
enhancing product safety is the only, or even the most 
important, goal of imposing liability in the first place. The 
Green court rejected this contention: 
[The argument that product safety is not encouraged by liability for 
unknowable dangers] focuses on one public policy underlying strict 
products liability while ignoring a second, more important policy 
consideration. Although products liability law is intended in part to 
make products safer for consumers, the primary “rationale 
underlying the imposition of strict liability on manufacturers and 
sellers is that the risk of the loss associated with the use of defective 
products should be borne by those who have created the risk and 
who have reaped the profit by placing a defective product in the 
stream of commerce.”108 
The court in Green refused to allow a knowability 
defense, adhering instead to a pure consumer expectation test 
which does not involve examination of what the manufacturer 
knew and when the manufacturer knew it. 
The Green opinion is particularly noteworthy for its 
detailed analysis and rejection of the defendant’s contention 
that the evolution of Wisconsin law prior to Green required 
that the danger be foreseeable in order for the manufacturer to 
be liable for injuries caused by that danger. The defendant, 
with some support, argued that earlier opinions had settled 
Wisconsin law as establishing that strict product liability 
would not apply in cases where “a manufacturer does not and 
cannot foresee the risk of harm presented by its product.”109 The 
court painstakingly analyzed away earlier opinions cited by the 
defendant, reaching the conclusion that Wisconsin law did not 
embody a knowability requirement.110 It further refused to 
adopt the Third Restatement, which it viewed as a change to 
its own law. Not only did the newest Restatement fail to serve 
“the policies underlying strict products liability law,” said the 
  
 107 Id. at 746. 
 108 Id. at 750 (quoting Kemp v. Miller, 453 N.W.2d 872, 879 (Wis. 1990)).  
 109 Id. at 745. 
 110 Id. at 745-751. 
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court, it added both the requirement that the plaintiff prove 
negligence and a reasonable alternative design to the burden 
on the consumer. The court refused to “impose such a burden 
on injured persons.”111 
The Supreme Court of Montana also refused to adopt a 
knowability requirement in Sternhagen v. Dow Co.112 The court 
adhered to its imputed knowledge test, stating that “[u]nder 
the imputation of knowledge doctrine, which is based on strict 
liability’s focus on the product and not the manufacturer’s 
conduct, knowledge of a product’s undiscovered or 
undiscoverable dangers shall be imputed to the manufacturer. 
Our adoption of the imputation of knowledge doctrine [brings 
with it a] concomitant rejection of the state-of-the-art 
defense.”113 
Sternhagen and Green differ from Beshada in one 
important respect. Like Beshada, they impose liability for 
unknowable dangers. Like Beshada, they are true to the 
original formulations of the tests for defect, the imputation of 
knowledge and the consumer expectation tests, respectively. 
But they differ from Beshada in one important respect: timing. 
They come at the end of the process of dismantling strict 
products liability, not at the beginning, and represent a return 
to the doctrine’s first principles. The Beshada court, writing at 
the beginning of strict products liability, simply followed its 
own definition of defect in imputing knowledge to the 
manufacturer, refusing to create an exception for unknowable 
dangers. Sternhagen and Green, on the other hand, were 
written after an exception for unknowable dangers had been 
created. They are all the stronger for confronting the 
arguments that led to the development of the Third 
Restatement, then rejecting them. Sternhagen and Green 
should prove more durable than Beshada, if only because they 
confront the years of backtracking and return to the doctrine’s 
origins: given a choice between leaving the costs of a defective 
product on an innocent consumer and placing them on the 
manufacturer, the choice is clear. The manufacturer should 
pay. 
  
 111 Green, N.W.2d at 752.  
 112 935 P.2d 1139 (Mont. 1997). 
 113 Id. at 1143. 
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B.  Consumer Expectation Test 
The Third Restatement eliminated any consumer 
expectation tests from its concept of products liability, adopting 
an exclusive risk-utility test instead.114 This cleverly removed 
another means by which manufacturers might be liable for 
unknowable dangers, because such knowability is irrelevant to 
what the consumer might or might not have expected from the 
product at issue.115 Removing the consumer from the products 
liability equation is highly significant, and symbolic of the 
orientation of the Third Restatement towards protecting 
manufacturers.116 As has been discussed above, courts that fled 
from liability for unknowable dangers focused exclusively on 
the impact of such liability on manufacturers, not on the 
impact of non-liability on the injured consumer. It seems 
appropriate that the Third Restatement, which eliminated any 
liability for unknowable dangers, would also, like the courts 
before it, remove the consumer from the determination of 
defectiveness altogether. 
Confronted by this newly imposed consumer invisibility, 
and feeling a renewed need to respond to it, courts and some 
legislatures have rejected removal of the consumer from the 
equation. In Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP Inc., the court not 
only reaffirmed its commitment to the consumer expectation 
test, but also reaffirmed its commitment to the consumer 
expectation test as the sole test of defectiveness, even in cases 
involving open and obvious dangers and complex products, two 
areas where the consumer expectation test had proved 
problematic. When the danger is open and obvious, the Green 
court pointed out, the product will pass a consumer expectation 
test, but suit may be brought for “negligence, breach of implied 
  
 114 Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Indus., Inc., 784 A.2d 1178, 1182-83 (N.H. 
2001) (stating that § 2(b) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts requires proof of a 
reasonable alternative design in design cases, and pointing out that, under New 
Hampshire law, proof of a reasonable alternative design is only one possible factor to 
be considered under a risk-utility analysis) 
 115 Green, 629 N.W.2d at 742. 
 116 One commentator has pointed out that various sources characterize § 2(b) 
of the Restatement (Third) as “a wish list from manufacturing America.” Douglas A. 
Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700, 1727 n.116 (2003) 
(quoting Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 751 n.16 (Wis. 2001) 
(quoting Frank J. Vandall, Constructing a Roof Before the Foundation is Prepared: The 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability section 2(b) Design Defect, 30 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 261, 261 (1997))).  
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warranty, or breach of express warranty.”117 Complexity of the 
product was simply irrelevant, in the court’s view, because the 
issue was whether “the product falls below . . . minimum 
consumer expectations,” and not the “scientific understanding 
of the product itself . . . . This court frequently has upheld use 
of the consumer-contemplation test in cases involving complex 
products.”118 In vigorously reaffirming its commitment to the 
consumer expectation test, the Green court renewed its 
dedication to § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and 
firmly rejected the Third Restatement’s formulations. 
The Supreme Court of Kansas agreed, and in Delaney v. 
Deere & Co. renewed its commitment to the consumer 
expectation test by rejecting both an exclusive risk-utility 
approach and the requirement of a reasonable alternative 
design: 
[W]e agree that as the foreword to the Third Restatement makes 
clear, the new Restatement “goes beyond the law.” Hazard, Foreword 
to Restatement (Third) of Torts, xv, xvi (1997). Rather than simply 
taking a photograph of the law of the field, the Third Restatement 
goes beyond this to create a framework for products liability. We 
have examined Comment 1 and find it wanting. The adoption of 
Comment 1 necessarily involves the adoption of the reasonable 
alternative design standard and an exclusive risk-utility analysis of 
that reasonable alternative design to determine whether the subject 
product is defective. This is contrary to the law in Kansas. To 
summarize the law in Kansas, whether a design defect in a products 
exists is determined using the consumer expectations test.119 
Other courts have come to the same conclusion. As in 
Delaney, a number of courts have rejected the Third 
Restatement’s reliance on a risk-utility test and its 
requirement of a reasonable alternative design because these 
tests reject the consumer expectation standard altogether. As 
the court stated in Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., in the 
course of rejecting the Third Restatement, “[T]he defendants 
propose that it is time for this court to abandon the consumer 
expectation standard and adopt the requirement that the 
plaintiff must prove the existence of a reasonable alternative 
design in order to prevail on a design defect claim. We decline 
to accept the defendants’ invitation.”120  Unlike the court in 
  
 117 Green, 629 N.W.2d at 743. 
 118 Id. at 742. 
 119 Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 946 (Kan. 2000). 
 120 694 A.2d 1319, 1331 (Conn. 1997). See also Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 
P.2d 930, 945 (Kan. 2000) (The Kansas Supreme Court Justices stated: “However, 
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Green, however, the Potter court did not view consumer 
expectation as the sole test of defectiveness: 
Although today we adopt a modified formulation of the consumer 
expectation test, we emphasize that we do not require a plaintiff to 
present evidence relating to the product’s risks and utility in every 
case. . . . [T]he ordinary consumer expectation test is appropriate 
when the everyday experience of the particular product’s users 
permits the inference that the product did not meet minimum safety 
expectations. Conversely, the jury should engage in the risk-utility 
balancing required by our modified consumer expectation test when 
the particular facts do not reasonably permit the inference that the 
product did not meet the safety expectations of the ordinary 
consumer.121 
Refusing to adopt § 6(c) of the Third Restatement, and 
salvaging consumer expectation as an important part of 
products liability, another court remarked: 
Next, defendant asks us to adopt section 6(c) of the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Product liability. That section provides: 
A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe 
due to defective design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed 
by the drug or medical device are sufficiently great in 
relation to is foreseeable therapeutic benefits that 
reasonable health-care providers, knowing of such 
foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not 
prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of 
patients. 
This section completely eliminates appraisal of the 
consumer’s expectations from determination of whether a 
medical device is unreasonably dangerous. Thus, the section 
conflicts with Illinois law. 
Moreover, the section provides manufacturers with virtual 
immunity from liability for all medical products. Even when 
  
Kansas has consistently held that evidence of a reasonable alternative design may but 
is not required to be introduced in a design defect action. Kansas has not used the 
concept of reasonable alternative design to become the standard by which the 
questioned product is measured.”) (internal citation omitted); Couch v. Mine Safety 
Appliances Co., 728 P.2d 585, 586 (Wash. 1986) (holding that the availability of a 
reasonable alternative design is “not a necessary element of a plaintiff’s burden” in a 
defective design action). 
  In all fairness, it must be said that the Potter court did not include liability 
for unknowable dangers within the scope of strict products liability, ruling that 
manufacturers could only be liable for knowable dangers. Potter, 694 A.2d at 1328-29. 
The dangers in that case, however, were not unknowable. Id. at 1326. Potter also 
indicated that there might be cases involving complex products in which consumer 
expectation would not be an appropriate test because “an ordinary consumer may not 
be able to form expectations of safety.” Id. at 1333. 
 121 Potter, 694 A.2d at 1335 (citations omitted).  
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doctors discover unexpected injuries due to a medical device, 
they may find the device useful in some extreme cases. . . . 
Under section 6(c), the fact that the device remains useful 
for some patients would immunize the manufacturer from 
liability. 
Commentators have noted that section 6(c) represents a 
substantial departure from established common law 
throughout the country. . . . Most courts that have 
considered related provisions of the Restatement (Third) 
have refused to adopt them.122 
This last quotation, highly significant in terms of the 
subject matter of this article, indicates that the Third 
Restatement forced courts to take another look at where strict 
products liability had been and where it was going. The 
necessity for this reexamination was generated by Third 
Restatement itself.123  Faced with the total exclusion of 
consumers from products liability law, many courts rejected the 
Third Restatement and adhered to the law they had developed 
under the Second.  
C.  Reasonable Alternative Design 
The Third Restatement defines design defect in terms of 
the availability of an alternative feasible design. Under the 
Third Restatement, the plaintiff must prove the existence of a 
  
 122 Mele v. Howmedica, Inc., 808 N.E.2d 1026, 1038-39 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 123 For other courts and opinions rejecting the Third Restatement and 
approving the consumer expectation test, see Jackson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 60 S.W.3d 
800, 802 (Tenn. 2001) (reaffirming that, under Tennessee law, the consumer 
expectation test “is applicable to any products liability claim where the plaintiff 
intends to show that a manufacturer is liable for plaintiff’s injuries as a result of an 
unreasonably dangerous product”); Hiner v. Deere & Co., 340 F.3d 1190, 1197 (10th 
Cir. 2003) (affirming that the Kansas courts will continue to use the consumer 
expectation test as laid out in § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in defective 
design claims); Haddix v. Playtex Family Prods. Corp., 138 F.3d 681, 683-84 (7th Cir. 
1998); McCoy v. Whirlpool Corp., Nos. 02-2229-KHV, 02-2230-KHV, 02-2231-KHV, 
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11712, at *20-21 (D. Kan. July 8, 2003) (reiterating this point); 
Murphy v. Playtex Family Prods. Corp., 176 F. Supp. 2d 473, 486-87 (D. Md. 2001) 
(adopting the reasoning of the Seventh and Ninth circuits in Haddix and Papike). In 
Haddix, the court cited with approval the holding in Papike v. Tambrands, Inc., 107 
F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 1997), and held that the risk of contracting Toxic Shock Syndrome 
was within an ordinary consumer’s knowledge and so, even though the jurisdiction 
allows for use of either the consumer expectation test or the risk-utility test, in 
defective design cases where you have “a simple product which poses an obvious 
danger” the risk-utility test is inapplicable and the consumer expectation test must be 
applied. Haddix, 138 F.3d at 684, 686.  
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reasonable alternative design in order to show that the 
product’s design was defective.  
Ironically, the trend toward incorporating risk-utility 
analysis into a consumer expectation test with the goal of 
broader protection in cases of obvious product danger 
metamorphosed into the Third Restatement’s abolition of the 
consumer expectation test, with its alternative goal of 
shrinking consumer protection.  “Substitution of a risk-utility 
analysis, however, especially as formulated in the Restatement 
(Third), has attracted considerable criticism and has been 
viewed as a retrogression, as returning to negligence concepts 
and placing a very difficult burden on plaintiffs.”124  The 
Supreme Court of Kansas reacted with horror to the Third 
Restatement’s requirement of a reasonable alternative design:  
The Third Restatement’s requirement that a plaintiff produce a 
reasonable alternative design has been harshly criticized.  See 
Vargo, The Emperor’s New Clothes: The American Law Institute 
Adorns a “New Cloth” for Section 402A Products Liability Design 
Defects—A Survey of the States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. 
MEM. L. REV. 493 (1996); Frank Vandall, State Judges Should Reject 
the Reasonable Alternative Design Standard of the Restatement 
(Third), Products Liability, Section 2(b), 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 62 
(1998); Westerbeke, The Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 
8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 66 (1998). Vandall states that the 
reasonable alternative design requirement is not supported by public 
policy or economic analysis because the cost of processing a case will 
make it economically impossible to produce a reasonable alternative 
design in a small products liability case.  8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y at 
63.  Further, contrary to the view of the authors of the Third 
Restatement that the majority of states require a reasonable 
alternative design to establish a design defect, research by John F. 
Vargo indicates that very few states in fact have this requirement.  
See 26 U. MEM. L. REV. at 550-553.  Vargo, in his exhaustive review, 
examines the Restatement (Third) of Torts’ claim that “reasonable 
alternative design” is the majority rule in this country and concludes 
that, far from a majority rule, only three states require a reasonable 
alternative design and five do so by statute.  See Appendix IV and 
related textual support for author’s conclusions, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 
at 951, 501-951.125 
  
 124 Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 792 A.2d 1145, 1154 (Md. 2002). The court 
further pointed out that, despite efforts by the Reporters of the Third Restatement to 
portray this as the majority view, it was unclear that most courts would agree with this 
position, and, “to the extent that it is shared, it has been criticized as representing an 
unwanted ascendency of corporate interests under the guise of tort reform.” Id. at 
1154-55. 
 125 Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 945-46 (Kan. 2000).  
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The goal of requiring a reasonable alternative design 
was clearly retrogressive. Under this standard, manufacturers 
would never be liable unless the product could have been made 
safer. In other words, there would be no such thing as a 
product that was unavoidably dangerous and defective. Under 
the Third Restatement, manufacturers would only be liable for 
products with curable dangers, and never for product designs 
that could not be changed to reduce or eliminate hazards.  
This shift in focus to protecting manufacturers is all the 
more pernicious because strict products liability was developed 
to protect consumers.126  The focus should be on the injured 
consumer and the product that caused the injury, and not on 
the manufacturer’s conduct. Focus on the manufacturer’s 
conduct amply appears in negligence based doctrine, but strict 
products liability was supposed to be something else.  
Faced with the Third Restatement, however, courts 
have realized that products liability doctrine is at risk of losing 
the attributes that led to its development in the first place. In 
few contexts is this clearer than in that of prescription drugs. 
Section 6(c) of the Third Restatement pronounces that a 
prescription pharmaceutical is only defective if no doctor would 
ever prescribe it to any “class of patients” for any condition. It 
is highly unlikely that any plaintiff could ever meet this burden 
of proof, as it is hard to imagine a drug that has passed 
through the FDA processes and is not useful to any patient 
whatsoever. As one court pointed out: 
The Third Restatement was intended as “a complete overhaul” of the 
Second Restatement. These changes have garnered substantial 
criticism. In particular, 6(c) has been criticized for its failure to 
reflect existing case law, its lack of flexibility with regard to drugs 
involving differing benefits and risks, its unprecedented application 
of a reasonable physician standard, and the fact that a consumer’s 
claim could easily be defeated by expert opinion that the drug had 
some use for someone, despite potentially harmful effects on a large 
class of individuals. To date, no court has adopted the Third 
  
 126 See Andrew F. Popper, Tort Reform Policy More Than State Law 
Dominates Section 2 of the Third Restatement, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 38, 40 (1999): 
Controversy happens when you deal with a product that is made by a 
company that is not negligent and the product ends up killing people, and 
there is no readily available alternative, or the cost of producing an available 
alternative is prohibitive. In that area, the Restatement fails you, as judges, 
and, more importantly, fails the public. 
Id. at 41. 
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Restatement’s strict liability test for prescription drugs, and one 
court has explicitly refused to adopt the test.127 
The Third Restatement thus brought out in the codified open 
what courts had been comfortable doing on a case by case basis.  
Eliminating the consumer expectation test in favor of a 
risk utility test is one thing when its dilution is designed to 
further the goal of consumer protection, as was the case when 
it was modified so as to avoid precluding liability for open and 
obvious hazards. It is quite another when the goal of its 
abolition is to protect manufacturers, a goal that becomes 
patently clear when the risk-utility test is coupled with the 
requirement of a reasonable alternative design. In Vautour v. 
Body Masters Sports Industries, the court pointed out that 
adopting a risk-utility test did not automatically mean that the 
plaintiff had to prove a reasonable alternative design. “The 
plaintiffs’ burden was to present evidence regarding the risk-
utility factors; they did not have the duty of proving a safer, 
alternative design.”128 Risk-utility tests can exist in the absence 
of a reasonable alternative design requirement, and “the rigid 
prerequisite of a reasonable alternative design places too much 
emphasis on one of many possible factors that could potentially 
affect the risk-utility analysis.”129 Requiring a reasonable 
alternative design simply brought the goal of deterring 
lawsuits out in the open. The Vautour court decided that “the 
risk-utility test as currently applied protects the interests of 
both consumers and manufacturers in design defect cases, and 
we decline to adopt section 2(b) of the [Third] Restatement.”130  
There has been considerable controversy surrounding the adoption of 
Restatement (Third) of Torts § 2(b).  Most of the controversy stems 
from the concern that a reasonable alternative design requirement 
would impose an undue burden on plaintiffs . . . . Commentators 
have noted that for suits against manufacturers who produce highly 
complex products, the reasonable alternative design requirement 
will deter the complainant from filing suit because of the enormous 
costs involved in obtaining expert testimony. Thus, because of the 
increased costs to plaintiffs of bringing actions based on defective 
product design, commentators fear that an alternative design 
requirement presents the possibility that substantial litigation 
  
 127 Bryant v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 723, 727 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) 
(internal citations omitted).  
 128 784 A.2d 1178, 1184 (N.H. 2001). 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
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expenses may effectively eliminate recourse, especially in cases in 
which the plaintiff has suffered little damage.131  
The Sternhagen court likewise refused to adopt the 
Third Restatement=s requirement of a reasonable alternative 
design, comprehensively rejecting the Third Restatement on 
several grounds simultaneously: 
We decline to extend [the requirement of a reasonable alternative 
design] to cases where alternative designs did not exist and a 
product’s dangers were undiscovered or undiscoverable at the time of 
manufacture. If we were to do so, we would inject negligence 
concepts into Montana’s strict products liability law and eviscerate 
the public policy underlying strict products liability law in this 
State.132  
Injecting negligence concepts into strict products 
liability law was, of course, precisely the goal of the Third 
Restatement. Indeed, as the courts point out, there is nothing 
left of strict products liability under the Third Restatement.  
IV.  CONCLUSION: THE BITER BIT  
The Third Restatement forced courts to confront their 
own roles in eliminating protections for injured plaintiffs and 
the potential for further harm the Restatement’s ratification 
could create. It is this recognition of the doctrine’s erosion and 
the resultant need to confront it that has caused, even 
compelled courts—to return to strict products liability. Once 
the changes that had gradually been made under § 402A were 
openly accepted, courts recognized how far strict products 
liability had strayed from its origins and goals, and realized 
that the Third Restatement was at risk of abolishing it 
altogether. For the same reasons that strict products liability 
was originally adopted, the courts are now in the process of 
reaffirming their commitment to retaining—or reinstating—
the doctrine.133  
The Third Restatement did one of two things in every 
jurisdiction in which it was invoked. In some jurisdictions, it 
codified the law as it had developed over the years, with 
rejection of liability for unknowable dangers, elimination of the 
consumer expectation test, and a requirement of a reasonable 
  
 131 Id. at 182-83 (internal citations omitted). 
 132 Sternhagen v. Dow Co., 935 P.2d 1139, 1147 (Mont. 1997). 
 133 Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 946 (Kan. 2000). 
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alternative design. This forced courts in those jurisdictions to 
confront the fact that strict products liability had been 
incrementally eroded almost to the point where it had ceased to 
exist. In other jurisdictions, it provided courts with a view of 
strict products liability in contrast to the current one in place. 
This led courts to reexamine their prior law, developed under 
the Second Restatement, and in some cases, to reaffirm their 
commitment to that law. In providing a mirror for examination 
of strict products liability law, the Third Restatement 
frequently stood up poorly to the challenge of the Second, 
leading courts to take positions contrary to those expressed in 
the Third. Those advocating abandoning strict products 
liability might have done better to leave it alone, allowing the 
incremental process to continue its work. 
In short, the Third Restatement made explicit what 
courts had implicitly been doing in ruling that manufacturers 
would not be liable for failing to warn of unknowable dangers, 
for design defects in the absence of an alternative feasible 
design, or for products that failed consumer expectation tests. 
In this very explicitness lay the seeds of a renewal for strict 
products liability. Courts, more comfortable with exempting 
manufacturers from liability for products that failed a risk-
utility test on a case by case basis, had to confront the blanket 
nature of manufacturer exemption from liability for injuries to 
consumers who (like the manufacturers) could not avoid injury 
but who (unlike the manufacturers) were not responsible for 
and did not profit from the availability of the product. Faced 
with an uncompromising rule, courts, like the Sternhagen 
court, have come to recognize the fundamental unfairness of 
exempting manufacturers from paying for the injuries their 
products caused. Strict products liability has returned, and we 
ironically owe this return to the Third Restatement. 
What the Third Restatement did was prove too much. 
The pro-defendant trend, which the Third Restatement 
attempted to codify and encourage, had occurred, where it 
existed, without close scrutiny. It happened gradually, and in 
small steps that allowed courts to avoid confronting the plight 
into which consumers were being cast by their rulings. But 
turning this incremental phenomenon into a rule, as the Third 
Restatement did, pushed the courts too far and to hard down 
the slippery slope. It meant that the courts could no longer 
ignore what their own rulings had so subtly accomplished. It 
has also caused the re-examination of the ALI as an 
appropriate policy-making entity, leading to questions about 
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whether the ALI is any more qualified to make policy than the 
courts.134 
It is, of course, true that in the process of ruling in 
individual cases the courts were making bad law. A prime 
example is the rule that manufacturers could not be liable for 
failing to warn of unknowable dangers. The breadth of these 
rulings is breathtaking. But the route to liability through later 
distinctions between cases remained open. Feldman could 
pretend it was not overruling Beshada, and Brown could 
pretend it was limited to prescription pharmaceuticals, leaving 
its extension to all products to Anderson. In a common law 
area, distinguishing earlier precedent to achieve a different 
result is itself an art. But when the rule is codified, such 
distinctions are no longer so easy to draw, ignore, or rationalize 
away.  
When the courts were faced with the Third 
Restatement, they were taken back to the days before strict 
products liability, when all agreed that consumers needed 
protection from dangerous and defective products, protection 
that negligence standards could not supply. The rationale 
behind strict products liability was that manufacturers should 
be liable, even in the absence of negligence, because it was 
appropriate that manufacturers compensate equally innocent 
plaintiffs for injuries caused by defective products. Instead of 
adopting the Third Restatement, many courts have returned to 
the idea that gave birth to strict products liability in the first 
place: as between innocent plaintiffs and innocent 
manufacturers, the manufacturers should pay for the injuries 
caused by their defective products.   
The causal link between the Third Restatement and the 
renewal of strict products liability cannot be directly proven. 
Rather, circumstantial evidence leads to the conclusion that 
the Third Restatement, far from promoting the retreat from 
strict products liability, has caused its revival. First, opinions 
like Sternhagen carefully analyze the Third Restatement, 
making explicit exemptions that had earlier been implicit or 
disguised in opinions that rejected liability for unknowable 
dangers. Second, it seems unusual that the revival of strict 
products liability should occur in today’s world, where 
  
 134 See Marshall S. Shapo, Products Liability: The Next Act, 26 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 761, 766 (1998) (“[T]he processes of the ALI may have no comparative advantage 
with political institutions in making choices among political arguments.”). 
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conservatism is rampant and corporations are more powerful 
than ever. The recessions of the 1980s allowed corporations to 
cry poverty and persuade courts to rule in their favor, cutting 
back on laws that would have led to liability. The market 
failures of this decade should, at least in theory, produce the 
same results. The factor that differentiates this era from the 
1980s, however, is the very presence of the Third Restatement. 
Third, for lack of any other reason that would explain 
Sternhagen and its progeny other than the Third Restatement, 
I am left with a res ipsa loquitur of causation argument: post 
hoc, ergo propter hoc. 
 
